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Modifying the behavior, attitudes, and norms of the banking industry
and of banking regulatory agencies, in relation to issues of social
responsibility, is an accomplishment of major proportions. The Fed-
eral Community Reinvestment Act,' enacted in 1977 with that am-
bitious goal, has succeeded to a significant extent, and is likely to
become increasingly important in coming years. The decade that has
elapsed since 1977 provides a basis for assessment of the approach,
the numerous inherent flaws, and the successes of the Act.
A vociferous public debate in many urban areas in the mid-1970s
focused on the issue of whether banks and other financial institutions
that accumulated deposits in neighborhoods having lower-income or
racial minority residents owed any responsibility to make mortgage
loans available in those neighborhoods. Is it necessary, or even
proper, for a depository institution to adopt, as a goal of its overall
lending policy, the objective of affirmatively contributing to the
economic health of particular neighborhoods? Prior to 1977, the
answer to the banking industry was a resounding and uneqivocal
"No. ' 2 The federal regulatory authorities fully supported and en-
couraged the conviction of bankers that financial safety and profit-
ability of depository institutions were the only acceptable goals,
regardless of the effect on surrounding communities.3
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2909 (1982). The Community Reinvestment Act (C.R.A.) is Title
VIII of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat.
1147 (1977).
2. Community Credit Needs: Hearings on S. 406 Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Hearings on S.
4061. See, e.g., statements in opposition to enactment of C.R.A. submitted by the National
Savings and Loan League, id. at 279-80; the American Bankers Association, id. at 314; the
National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, id. at 334; and the United States League of
Savings Associations, id. at 366, 368.
3. See infra note 52. Hearings on S. 406, supra note 2, at 14, 15 (statements in opposition
to enactment of C.R.A. submitted by Arthur F. Bums, Chairman of the Federal Reserve
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Community groups were incensed with this lack of concern for the
social effects of institutional credit decisions. They pointed to evi-
dence that many depository institutions systematically denied loans
to creditworthy individuals residing in disfavored neighborhoods, and
that the practice was often closely correlated with racial discrimina-
tion.4 Some activists attributed malevolence and responsibility for
deterioration of neighborhoods to depository institutions.5 Many
people called for mandatory lending in neighborhoods from which
deposits were drawn 6-- proposals which the banking industry argued
would be unworkable, counterproductive, and financially disastrous. 7
The resulting legislation rejected both extremes. The Community
Reinvestment Act (C.R.A.) carefully avoided rigid government credit
allocation.8 It sought instead to modify the attitudes and orientations
of decision-makers in the banking industry and federal supervisory
agencies. The Act resolved the dispute over principles and required
good-faith efforts to improve lending practices. 9 In an age in which
government regulation commonly took the form of detailed require-
ments, quotas, and timetables, C.R.A. followed a very different
model. It established a direction and goal, and then allowed private
industry latitude and discretion in choosing methods to attain the
goal.
The mechanism for enforcement was to be "encouragement" from
the federal agencies that routinely supervised depository institutions
in detail, together with a significant economic sanction for continued
refusal to respond favorably to the "encouragement.' 0 A financial
Board and Robert E. Barnett, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(F.D.I.C.)). The traditional views of the agencies are discussed in greater detail in infra notes
133-38 and accompanying text. The similarity of views between federal regulators and the
regulated institutions may be partially due to the fact that the agencies' governing boards are
frequently elected by the institutions, and their funding is derived from the institutions. See
Note, Legislating Against Mortgage Credit Redlining: The Need for a Firmer Commitment,
12 RuTOERS L.J. 151, 178-79 (1980).
4. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
5. The tenor of the accusations is described and analyzed in, e.g., Marcuse, The Deceptive
Consensus on Redlining: Definitions Do Matter, 45 J. Am. PLA". A. 549 (1979); Lucey, The
Redlining Battle Continues: Discriminatory Effect v..Business Necessity Under the Fair Housing
Act, 8 B.C. ENvTL. Ass. L. Rv. 357, 359-63 (1979); W. DENNIS & J. POTTINGER, FEDERPAL
REGULATION OF BANKING: REDLINING AND CoMMuNITY RNEV SmmNT: ANALYsIs, COMMENTARY
AND COMPIANCE PROCEDURES 1-5 to 1-7 (1980).
6. See infra notes 44 & 46 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 47.
8. See infra note 43.
9. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2903 (1982).
10. C.R.A. states in part: "The Congress finds that ... regulated financial institutions
have continuing and affirmative obligation [sic] to help meet the credit needs of the local
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institution that refused to act to improve its record of serving the
credit needs of its entire community, including low- and middle-income
residents, could be denied permission to open new branch offices,
relocate offices, merge, or complete any of a number of other
transactions that routinely require regulatory approval."
The effect of C.R.A. has been uneven, with marked variations
among the different branches of the financial services industry12 and
the four separate federal regulatory agencies, which include the
Federal Reserve, 13 Comptroller of the Currency' 4 Federal Home Loan
Bank Board,' 5 and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.' 6 For
example, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (which supervises
savings and loan associations) appears to have fully accepted its
responsibilities, while the Federal Reserve Board (which regulates
commercial banks) retains strong ideological resistance to the goals
communities in which they are chartered." 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
C.R.A. also instructs the supervisory agency to "encourage such institutions" to help meet
the local community needs. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1982). The agencies are further instructed to
"assess the institution's record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community, including
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods ... " and to "take such record into account in its
evaluation of an application for a deposit facility .... ." 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1982) (emphasis
added). The agencies understandably had difficulty determining whether a difference existed
between "local" and "entire" communities, and finally determined that no distinction was
intended. The mandatory language of the Act is directed exclusively to the agencies, not the
depository institutions, but the plainly apparent sanctions apply to the institutions, not to the
agencies. No definition of "credit needs" or "community" is to be found in the Act. Depository
institutions are expected "to help meet credit needs," but no information is provided covering
specifically the method or degree of help, and the goal is qualified by the clause "consistent
with safe and sound operation of such institution[s]." 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901(b), 2903(1) (1982).
See also infra note 58 and accompanying text.
11. See 12 U.S.C. § 2902(3) (1982). The list includes applications for a new federal
charter, deposit insurance, establishment of a new branch, relocation of an office, merger
consolidation, and acquisition of assets or shares in another regulated institution. A few types
of changes in operation by financial institutions are not included, such as closing an office,
and entry into the Federal Reserve System.
12. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902-2905 (1982). Not all depository institutions are included within
the categories covered by the Act. Notably absent are credit unions, many of which are
regulated by the National Credit Union Administration.
13. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System regulates bank holding
companies and state-chartered commercial banks which are members of the System. 12 U.S.C.
§ 2902(1)(B) (1982).
14. The Comptroller of the Currency regulates national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(l)(A)
(1982).
15. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulates savings and loan associations and
savings banks whose deposits are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpo-
ration (including all federally-chartered associations), and savings and loan holding companies.
12 U.S.C. § 2902(1)(D) (1982).
16. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regulates state chartered commercial banks
and savings banks whose deposits the Corporation insures but which are not Federal Reserve
System members. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(1)(C) (1982).
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of C.R.A. 17 The primary force for change has not been the agencies
themselves, but rather community groups which have accrued im-
portant new leverage in negotiations with depository institutions.18
In analyzing the significance and effects of the C.R.A., this article
begins with the underlying controversy over "redlining" and "credit
allocation," and then discusses the standards and the enforcement
process created by the Act and regulations. Separate treatment is
accorded to each of the primary actors in the process: community
groups, depository institutions, and federal supervisory agencies.
Finally, the article reflects on prospects for the future of C.R.A. in
an age of bank deregulation, and concludes that the significance of
C.R.A. will increase rather than diminish.
I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: THE PROBLEM OF "REDLInING" AND
THE SPECTER OF "CREDIT ALLOCATION"
Decisions of private lending institutions can have a major impact
on communities. A spokesperson for the banking industry has de-
scribed the availability of mortgage credit as "the lifeblood of the
neighborhood," and "absolutely essential for neighborhood preser-
vation or improvement.' ' 19 Unavailability of private financing is
correlated with depressed housing prices, disrepair, reduced incidence
of owner-occupied dwellings, and ultimately a stigma as a declining
neighborhood. This stigma is exceedingly difficult to overcome and
may lead to further serious deterioration.20 Federal lending or mort-
gage insurance does not provide an adequate or effective alternative
17. The records of each of the four regulatory agencies are discussed and compared in
part V of this Article.
18. See part III of this Article, discussing the role of community groups, and part IV,
section A, analyzing the pragmatic pressures imposed on depository institutions to modify
their lending policies.
19. Van Alstyne, Redlining-The Cure Worse Than the Illness, 3 J. CONTEMIP. L. 264,
269 (1977). Accord D. LISTOKIN & S. CASEY, MORTGAGE LENDING AND RACE: CONCEPTUAL
ANDANALYTICAL PERSPE CT vES OF THE URBAN FNANCING PROBLEM 5 (1980); Memorandum
Regarding the Policies and Practices of the Federal National Mortgage Association (F.N.M.A.
Nov. 1977), cited in Dennis, The Dual Housing Credit Market, in DISCRMINATION IN MORTGAGE
CREDIT: REGULATION, LInGATION, AND COMPLIANCE 297, 351 (V. Dennis & D. Glascoff, Jr.,
eds., Prac. L. Inst. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Dennis, The Dual Housing Credit Market].
20. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 634, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See also Fefferman, The
Redlining of Neighborhoods by Mortgage Lending Institutions and What Can Be Done About
It, in REDLInNG: A SPECIAL REPORT By FNMA 25, 27 (Jan. 1976); Duncan, Hood & Neet,
Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation, and Urban Decay: Neighborhood Housing Services
as a Viable Alternative, 7 UP.. LAW. 510, 511 (1975); Phillips & Bryson, Refinancing: A First
Step Toward a Realistic Housing Program for the Poor, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 835 (1971);
Renne, Eliminating Redlining by Judicial Action: Are Erasers Available?, 29 VAND. L. REv.
987 (1976).
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to private credit, and in fact has at times become part of the problem
rather than part of the solution to neighborhood deterioration. 2'
The controversy leading to enactment of C.R.A. focused on
"redlining"22-a term based on the imagery of a financial institution
management designating, by red lines on a city map, neighborhoods
in which credit will be denied or will only be granted on a discrim-
inatory basis.2 Subsumed within the term as commonly used are at
21. Federal lending is a small fraction of the total mortgage credit market. At the end of
1984, all federal agencies, including the Federal Housing Administration, and the secondary
market agencies such as Federal National Mortgage Authority held only $158 billion in
mortgage debt (less than the holdings of mutual savings banks, the smallest category of
depository institution), as compared to $2.0 trillion held by all lenders. Fed. Res. Bd., Financial
and Business Statistics, Table 1.54, Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. A39 (June
1985). Moreover, federal programs can have counterproductive results. The F.H.A., for
example, liberalized its underwriting standards and created a high-risk insurance fund to
promote loans in urban areas faced with deterioration. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715e, f, 1735c (1982).
In operation, the program has in many instances promoted a cycle of bad loans, fast
foreclosures, and neighborhood deterioration. Because lenders are relieved of risk, they have
no incentive to assure that borrowers are creditworthy, or to allow a defaulting borrower to
cure. To the contrary, "points" paid in advance have the effect of providing a premium to
lenders who, after originating an F.H.A. loan, can quickly declare a default, collect on F.H.A.
insurance, then lend the money again, and thus earn additional "points." Kratovil, Mortgage
Law Today, 13 J. MASHA. L. REv. 251 (1980). J. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING: DISCRImiNATION
IN REAL ESTATE Comn.uNm DEvELoPmENT AND REVITALIZATION 282-85 (1983); Memorandum
regarding the Policies and Performance of the Federal National Mortgage Association, Comm.
Print, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (Nov. 22,
1977), excerpt reprinted in W. DEnIs & J. PoTriNGER, supra note 5, at 1-9; B. BOYER, CIms
DESTROYED FOR CASH 11 (1973), cited in Note, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56
B.U.L. REv. 989, 1003 (1976). See also Duncan, Hood & Neet, supra note 20, at 519-20. One
study found lenders to be seven times more likely to foreclose on F.H.A. loans than on
conventional loans. Gov. COMM'N ON MORT. PRAcs., REPORT ON HoME OWNERSHIP IN
IruNois-TIHE ELusrvE DREAua 54 (1974), cited in Note, supra, at 1003. The effect of fast
foreclosure of F.H.A. mortgages has been so devastating in many urban neighborhoods that
F.H.A. programs are widely viewed as part of the problem of neighborhood deterioration
rather than part of the solution. M. PRZYBYLSKI, PERCEPTIONS OF RISK: THE BANKER'S MYTm:
AN EioiT CrrY SuRVEY OF MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE DATA 237-38 (Nat. Train. & Info. Ctr. 2d
ed. 1978); Mort. Bankers Ass'n of Am., Task Force, Redlining: Solution Requires Unified
Approach II (undated), reprinted in MORTGAGE BANKER 46 (Apr. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
M.B.A.A. Task Force, Redlining]; TR-STATE REGION. PLAN. COsi'N, "GREENLINING" URBAN
NEIGHBORHOODS: A RECONNAISANCE OF ANTIREDLINING REFORMS IN NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY
AN CONNECTICUT AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIONS 4 (Inter. Tech. Rep. 3402
Jan. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Tm-STATE, GREENLINING]. Reliance entirely on public partic-
ipation is unsatisfactory for reasons which extend beyond the administrative problems of
F.H.A. Large quantities of government subsidized credit in a neighborhood can create a
stigma-an indication of excessive risk, further increasing the reluctance of depository insti-
tutions to extend conventional credit. W. DENNIS & J. PorrINGER, supra note 5, at 9-72.
22. McCluskey, The Community Reinvestment Act: Is It Doing the Job?, 100 BANKING
L.J. 33 (1983); Note, Automated Teller Machines Under the New York Banking Law. Do
They Serve Community Credit Needs?, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 117, 139-42 (1986). Redlining is
discussed at length in the legislative history. See, e.g., SENATE Com. ON BANKING, HOUSING,
& URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE HousiNo AND CoM 'uaTY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1977, S.
REP. No. 175, at 34 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 175].
23. Senator Proxmire, the Congressional sponsor of C.R.A., intended the Act to address
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least three elements that, though often closely related, are concep-
tually distinct: racial and ethnic discrimination, geographic discrimi-
nation, and neighborhood disinvestment.
A. Racial Discrimination
Discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities is the aspect of
redlining that is most offensive to public policy and that has received
the earliest and most thorough legislative attention. Studies in at least
a dozen cities have demonstrated that redlining has a disproportion-
ately high impact on minority groups, even after accounting 'for
legitimate risk factors and differences in demand for loans. 4
For long periods in our country's history, institutional lenders
routinely denied applications for mortgage credit in areas that were
racially integrated or considered to be threatened by integration. Such
discrimination was widely accepted as legitimate-mandated by the
fiduciary duty owed by financial institutions to their depositors and
shareholders32 Generally-accepted appraisal standards downgraded
redlining, and explained:
By redlining let me make it clear what I am talking about. I am talking about the
fact that banks and savings and loans will take their deposits from a community
and instead of reinvesting them in that community, they will invest them elsewhere,
and they will actually or figuratively draw a red line on a map around the areas of
their city, sometimes in the inner city, sometimes in the older neighborhoods,
sometimes ethnic and sometimes black, but often encompassing a great area of their
neighborhood.
123 CONG. REc. S8958 (daily ed. June 6, 1977). Reference to red lines on a city map is
common in the real estate credit literature. See, e.g., Fefferman, supra note 20, at 26; Badain,
Insurance Redlining and the Future of the Urban Core, 16 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoEs. 1, 4
(1980); Bowsher, The Three-Year Experience with the Community Reinvestment Act, 64 FED.
RES. BANK ST. Louis REv., Feb. 1982, at 3; W. DENIns & J. POTTINGER, supra note 5, at I-
4.
24. See, e.g., R. SCHAFER & H. LADD, DISCRIBINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDiNo 287, 292-
300 (1981); Phillips & Bryson, supra note 20; G. STmEuRuEB, TE TEEivniEN LANDLORD 107-
19 (1966); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 1281 Before the Comm.
on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063, 1267 (1975).
25. This attitude was expressed, for example, in a public statement of the Chairman of
the F.D.I.C. in 1961:
There exists a possibility that the financing of a real estate purchase for a member
of a minority group might have a serious effect upon values in a neighborhood. If
the bank already had a substantial number and dollar volume of mortgage loans in
the neighborhood, it would necessarily consider the effect upon those assets ....
[E]very bank has a moral, as well as a legal, obligation and responsibility toward
the economic welfare of its depositors and stockholders.
W. DENNIS & J. POTTINGER, supra note 5, at 2-7 (citing U.S. CoMi'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
HousNG (1961)). A spokesman for the Mortgage Bankers Association of Metropolitan Wash-
ington stated that: "Applications from minority groups are not generally considered in areas
that are not recognized as being racially mixed, on the premise that such an investment would
be unattractive to institutional lenders." Id. (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, USA,
HousING IN WASH., D.C., 467 (1962)).
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areas "infiltrated" by minority groups. 26 The federal government,
acting through such agencies as the Federal Housing Administration, 27
supported and promoted the proposition that the loss of ethnic
homogeneity inevitably resulted in loss of property values.2  That
26. The mode of expression of race-based appraisal policies became increasingly veiled,
but the underlying assumptions remained, as indicated by a study tracing the code phrases
used for race in various editions of a widely used text, The Appraisal of Real Estate, published
by the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers. The 1935 edition stated that "infiltration"
by "colored people" inevitably led to decline in property values. The term used in 1938 was
"inharmonious racial group," and in 1960, "people of a lower economic status and different
social and cultural background." In 1975 reference was made to a "shift in the economic,
social and physical forces creating the environment," a clause that is both apparently neutral
and inpenetrably vague. Two years later, however, in 1977, training materials issued by the
appraisal institute contained, as an example of appropriate appraisal analysis, the following:
"The neighborhood is entirely Caucasian. It appears that there is no adverse effect by minority
groups." Discriminatory references were finally removed as a result of an agreement settling
a lawsuit brought by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. TIE POTOMAC
INST., INC., METRO. Hous. PROGRAM, LENDER'S GUIDE TO FAIR MORTGAGE POLICIES (1980).
For terms of the settlement, see United States v. American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers
of the Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, 442 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. I11. 1977), aff'd, 590 F.2d 242 (7th
Cir. 1978). The appraisers' standards were held to violate the Fair Housing Act.
27. The F.H.A., operating a mortgage insurance program designed to relieve lenders of
risk, was not itself willing to accept the risk of integration. Mandating that all insurable
mortgages be "economically sound," F.H.A. instructed its appraisers in 1938 to:
investigate areas surrounding the location to determine whether or not incompatible
racial and ethnic social groups are present, to the end that an intelligent prediction
can be made regarding the possibility or probability of the location being invaded
by such groups .... A change of social or racial occupancy leads to instability and
a reduction in values.
FED. Hous. ADMIm., UNDERWRiTiNG MANUAL §§ 935, 937 (1938). As an additional safeguard,
F.H.A.'s underwriting standards during the 1930s and 1940s recommended racially restrictive
covenants in the deeds of homes with F.H.A. mortgages. Id. § 980(3)(g). See also J. KUSHNER,
supra note 21, at 265, 282; Sloane, Federal Programs and Equal Housing Opportunity, in
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Civil Rights, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. at 135 (Cbmm. Print 1976), cited in Note, The Community Reinvestment Act
Regulations: Another Attempt to Control Redlining, 28 CATm. U.L. REv. 635 (1979); Dennis,
The Dual Housing Credit Market, supra note 19, at 302-03; Duncan, Hood & Neet, supra
note 20, at 517; Note, Is the U.S. Committed to Fair Housing? Enforcement of the Fair
Housing Act Remains a Crucial Problem, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 641, 646-47 (1980).
28. Racial integration was almost uniformly assumed, by both the private sector and
federal agencies, to produce loss of property value, and risk of mortgage default. Dennis, The
Dual Housing Credit Market, supra note 19, at 302-05; Lamb, Housing Discrimination and
Segregation in America: Problematical Dimensions and the Federal Legal Response, 30 CATH.
L. REv. 363, 371 (1981); see U.S. DEPT. OF Hous. & URB. DEV., THE DYNAM, ICS OF
NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE (1975), reproduced in MORT. BANKERS ASS'N OF AM., FINAL REPORT
OF THE REDL, NNG TASK FORCE, in Hearings on S. 406, supra note 2, at 406, 412; FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM COMPLIANCE MANUAL I.l.10-11; J. GUTTENTAO & S. NVACHTER, REDLININO
AND PUBIC POLICY (N.Y.U. Sch. of Bus. Monograph 1980-1) (citing several additional studies);
see also D. LIsTOriN & S. CASEY, supra note 19, at 7. Standard appraisal techniques not only
assumed that racial homogeneity was essential to maintain property values but, as recently as
1975, also provided "rankings of races and nationalities with respect to their beneficial effect
on land values." MCMICHAEL's APPRAISING MANUAL (1975), cited in FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
COMPIANCE MANUAL 1.1.12; TRI-STATE, GREENLINING, supra note 21. Until 1950, the Code
of Ethics of the National Association of Real Estate Boards (Realtors) provided that: "A
1078
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assumption, when pervasively accepted, can become a self-fulfilling
prophecy. 29
Current federal legislation, of course, prohibits racial discrimina-
tion in housing credit, the most direct statutes being the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act of 197730 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.31
Nevertheless, the attitudes and assumptions of financial institutions,
developed over many decades of officially sanctioned racial discrim-
ination in mortgage credit policy, realistically will not change quickly.
Although C.R.A. does not directly address racial discrimination, its
purpose and effects are consistent with the statutes prohibiting dis-
crimination, because allegations of failure to meet the credit needs
of a community are frequently correlated with allegations of racial
discrimination.12
B. Geographic Discrimination
A second element of the redlining controversy, and the one most
directly addressed by C.R.A., is discrimination that focuses not
directly on the race of the applicant for a mortgage loan but rather
realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood ... members of any
race or nationality, or any individuals whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property
values in that neighborhood." Quoted in Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1055 (E.D.
Mich. 1975); United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 534 (8th Cir. 1975).
29. If enough residents of a white neighborhood, panicked by the entry of a few minority
families, put their homes on the market in a short period of time, prices will be depressed.
Faced with this situation-or even the expectation of it-"prudent" lenders redline, thereby
making sales at the previously high prices impossible. The value of property in the neighborhood
does indeed decline, thereby realizing the worst fears of the "prudent" lenders. See, e.g.,
FEDERAL RESERVE SYsTEm COMPLIANCE MANUAL 1.1.10 (1983); Lamb, supra note 28, at 372;
R. BRANDEL & M. LARGE, A COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR THE COMMuNITY REINVESTMENT ACT:
BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS 8 (Consumer Banker's Ass'n 1978); R. STARR, HousiNG AND
THm MONEY MARKET 26 (1975); Downs, An Economic Analysis of Property Values and Race,
36 LAND ECON. 181 (1960); Duncan, Hood & Neet, supra note 20, at 517; Note, supra note
21.
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1982).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982). Racial and ethnic discrimination in housing finance
is prohibited. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1982). In addition, the Civil Rights Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982, granted to all citizens the same rights to buy property as are enjoyed by white citizens.
For discussions of the applicability of these Acts to problems of redlining, see Renne, supra
note 20; Duncan, Hood & Neet, supra note 20, at 522; McCluskey, The Community Rein-
vestment Act: Is It Doing the Job?, 100 BANKING L.J. 33, 50-53 (1983); Annot., "Redlining, "
Consisting of Denial of Home Loans or Insurance Coverage in Certain Neighborhoods, as
Discrimination in Violation of §§ 804 and 805 of Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C.S. §§ 3604,
3605), 73 A.L.R. FED. 899 (1985).
32. See, e.g., New York Public Interest Research Group, Take the Money and Run! Redlin-
ing in Brooklyn (1977); BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF Tim FEDERAL RESERVE SYsTEM, Order,
Ameritrust Corp., Cleveland, Ohio, 66 FED. RES. BULL. 238 (1980). The supervisory agencies
have stated that violation of Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity regulations are also
violations of C.R.A., thereby providing an additional mechanism for enforcement of the older
laws. See 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(f) (1986).
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on the location of the proposed collateral. Lenders generalize that
all properties within certain boundaries are unlikely to retain their
value, and hence are poor security for a loan, without regard to the
characteristics of the particular credit applicant or the specific col-
lateral. 33 To compensate for the perceived higher risk 34 loans in that
area are avoided, or are offered on terms less favorable than loans
in other areas.
In many respects, of course, location of the proposed collateral is
an unavoidably central and inherently reasonable criterion in the
credit decision. No reasonable government policy would compel or
even encourage private depository institutions to grant mortgage loans
on property that is, for example, below a flood plain, on a geologic
fault line, or clearly unsuited for its proposed use relative to adjoining
properties (such as an apartment house proposed to be built next to
a rendering plant). 35
The problem with unrestrained use of location as a primary cri-
terion in mortgage credit decisions is that, in some instances, dis-
crimination against a particular neighborhood may not be rationally
based or, even though rational, may produce results that are socially
unacceptable.36 One clear example would be a decision by depository
33. One aspect of the geographic discrimination phenomenon has been the traditional bias
of both private lenders and federal real estate credit agencies in favor of suburbs, at the
expense of urban areas, based on the assumption that neighborhoods inevitably decline as they
age. M.B.A.A. Task Force, Redlining, supra note 21, at 50 ("Because 'healthy' also suggests
relatively new, the implication is clear that anything more than a generation old is nearing the
end of its 'economic life'); M. Ppznaxsma, supra note 21, at 151-56; D. lUsToKIN & S. CASEY,
supra note 19, at 9.
34. See, e.g., J. GtTrENTAG & S. WACHTER, supra note 28; Earthman, Residential
Mortgage Lending: Charting a Course Through the Regulatory Maze, 29 VAND. L. Rnv. 957
(1976); Duncan, Hood & Neet, supra note 20, at 510; D. LIsToKIN & S. CASEY, supra note
19, at 11; Van Alstyne, supra note 19.
35. Testimony of William A. Beason, Jr., on behalf of National Association of Mutual
Savings Banks, in Hearings on S. 1281 before Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban
Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), cited in Note, Redlining: Should Local Government
Become Involved?, 10 U.C. DAvis L. Ray. 243 (1977); see also Van Alstyne, supra note 19,
at 269; D. LISToK N & S. CASEY, supra note 19, at 5. Additional locational factors mentioned
by the above sources include abandonment, demolition, and obvious deterioration of structures
in a neighborhood, and all tend to depress the value of nearby buildings. Marked deterioration
in government services, including street cleaning, building code enforcement, sanitation, schools,
etc., and increases in crime, tend to make property in the area less desirable and less valuable.
36. The four agencies agree that disproportionately few loans are made in low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods, compared with higher income areas, and that "[flactors such
as housing demand and safety and soundness considerations do not appear to account fully
for the extent of these disparities." Fed. Fin. Insts. Exam. Coun., C.R.A. Information
Statement, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,133 (1980) [hereinafter cited as F.F.I.E.C., C.R.A. Information
Statement] (emphasis added). One economist has defended the use by lending institutions of
generalizations based on race and neighborhood as rational, in that it avoids the costs of
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institutions to withhold credit from a neighborhood that was previ-
ously all white and displays no objective evidence of physical or
economic deterioration, solely because a few middle-class black fam-
ilies have moved in. Another, less apparent, example would be a
decision to extend credit only on single-family dwellings, when vir-
tually all of the housing in the area is multiple-family apartment
houses .37
The debate over whether lending institutions' decisions to withhold
mortgage credit initiates, contributes to, or merely responds to neigh-
borhood deterioration is one that has continued for decades, 3 and
is not likely ever to be conclusively resolved. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the unavailability of private mortgage credit is devastating to a
neighborhood's health and its ability to initiate or maintain growth
or revitalization.
Geographic discrimination takes a wide variety of forms, the most
obvious of which is outright refusal to consider applications for
mortgage loans in particular areas. Other forms include imposition
of more stringent credit terms for loans in some areas than would
be required for a similar loan elsewhere. Examples include larger
downpayments, higher interest rates, higher "points" and other loan
origination costs, lower loan-to-value ratios, and shorter terms. 39
obtaining information specific to the particular loan applicant or the particular collateral. J.
GUTrENTAG & S. vACHTER, supra note 28. "[I]f black loan applicants have lower income
stability than white applicants, and if more definitive information on income stability is costly
to obtain, it is not irrational to redline based on color." Id. at 14. Rationalizations such as
this point up the need to insert social policy judgments as a factor in private credit decisions,
and to promote at least minimal standards of equity to individuals from races or neighborhoods
disfavored by lenders who purport to be acting rationally.
37. One similar example was the policy of some Bronx banks to lend only on one to four-
unit residences and on buildings built after World War II, despite the fact the area was
composed overwhelmingly of large prewar apartment buildings. V. BENEDEK, C.R.A.: TEN
FiGrrs FOR REINVESTMENT 64 (Nat'l Train. & Info. Ctr. 1980).
38. See, e.g., M.B.A.A. Task Force, Redlining, supra note 21, at 47 (lenders react to,
rather than cause, neighborhood decline); Nelson, Some Perspectives on Redlining, in REDLN-
iNG: A SpEciAL REPORT BY F.N.M.A. 3, 6-8 (Jan. 1976) (lending practice is only one of many
factors involved in neighborhood decline); Wisniewski, Mortgage Redlining (Disinvestment):
The Parameters of Federal State, and Municipal Regulation, 54 J. UB. L. 367 (1977) (redlin-
ing accelerates decline).
39. Discussions of the multiplicity of redlining techniques are included in Hearings on
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, S. 1281, Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1975) (testimony of Dan Walker, former
governor of Illinois); Renne, supra note 20; Phillips & Bryson, supra note 20; Searing,
Discrimination in Home Finance, 48 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 1113 (1973); Note, Urban Housing
Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 110 (1976); TX-STATE, GREEN-
LrNING, supra note 21, at 1-2; Note, supra note 21; Lamb, supra note 28, at 403.
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Many policies which are facially neutral may also have the effect
of excluding from consideration disproportionate numbers of loans
on properties in certain neighborhoods. For example, imposing a
minimum loan amount or maximum age of a building to secure a
loan tends to exclude the lower-priced, older buildings which pre-
dominate in some urban areas. Some lenders have even specified a
minimum building lot width which is wider than most lots in their
areas, or have limited their lending to types of structures which are
not found in certain neighborhoods. Appraisal techniques may result
in a substantially lower appraised value for a building in one location
than for similar structures elsewhere, resulting in a smaller loan.40
C. Disinvestment
Central to the redlining controversy that led to C.R.A., but not
specifically treated in the Act as enacted, is the concept of "disin-
vestment"-the removal of financial resources from a community.
A major premise of many antiredlining activists is that savings
deposited by residents of a neighborhood should remain in that
neighborhood in the form of real estate loans. 41 Data was presented
to the congressional committee indicating that many institutions
"exported" ninety percent or more of the amount of deposits received
locally to other neighborhoods, while denying loans to credit-worthy
applicants in the neighborhood where the deposit-taking institutions
were located. 42 In some cases, not even one percent of the local
deposits were reinvested in the same neighborhood.4 3 Outrage over
this situation was and is central to much antiredlining activism, and
undoubtedly contributed to passage of C.R.A." (as is indicated in
use of the term reinvestment in its title).
40. Lamb, supra note 28, at 403.
41. See, e.g., M. PRzya yLsi, supra note 21, at 192 ("it is clear that the geographic areas
that generate a lender's deposits bear a priority claim over other areas for credit services").
42. S. REP. No. 175, supra note 22, at 34 (referring to a Washington D.C. savings and
loan association).
43. Id. One Chicago lender derived over $10 million in deposits from certain redlined
neighborhoods but failed to make a single loan in those areas. S. REP. No. 187, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., at 6 (1976). See also V. BENEDEK, supra note 37, at 15 (approximately 0.2% of
deposits in two savings and loan associations and two banks were returned as loans); N.Y.C.
CO1i5'N ON HUtiAN RIOHTS, REDLINING IN THE BRONX: AN ANALYSIS OF MORTGAGE LENDING
AcTIvITy By THE DOLLAR SAVINGS BANK (1978) (0.18% of deposits were lent locally); N.Y.C.
COMM'N ON HU,&AN RIOHTS, REDLINING IN ROCKAWAY 5 (between 3.3% and 5.80 of deposits
were invested in the community); N.Y. PUB. INT. RES. GROUP, SEEING RED: BANK REDLININO
IN CENTRAL HARLEM 11 (1979) (reinvestment ratios between 1% and 6%).
44. R. GOLDEN & J. ROSENBtrgo, CrrIzis REsEARCH GUIDE TO BANK RDLININO (N.Y.
Pub. Int. Res. Group 1979); V. BENEDEK, supra note 37.
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Disinvestment is closely related to geographic discrimination, but
the two nevertheless are conceptually distinct. Disinvestment, but not
geographic discrimination, is likely to occur in neighborhoods that
are healthy, thrifty, and mature, with low turnover of real estate and
low demand for mortgage credit. Thus, surplus savings flow to other
areas where the demand is greater. Conversely, geographic discrimi-
nation, but not disinvestment, is likely to be present in a neighbor-
hood in which credit-worthy applicants are denied for no justifiable
reason and in which savings deposits are very low. Funds from other
areas are needed to meet local demand, but are not forthcoming.
D. Credit Allocation
One approach to the issues of racial and geographic discrimination
and neighborhood disinvestment would be a policy of "credit allo-
cation"-a term nearly as ambiguous and controversial as the term
"redlining." The most extreme program of credit allocation would
consist of government-mandated extensions of credit to particular
types of loans, particular neighborhoods, or even particular borrow-
ers.
At the hearings of the Senate committee that drafted the legisla-
tion,45 many community groups focusing on the disinvestment issue
demanded a requirement that financial institutions invest in a partic-
ular neighborhood some proportion of the deposits received from
that neighborhood. Early drafts of the bill were not quite so restric-
tive, but did mandate lending in what was termed the "primary
savings service area" of the depository institution.46 Predictably, the
banking industry attacked that proposal as an unworkable and ex-
cessive intrusion into private credit decisions, 47 and the proposal was
abandoned.4 8
45. All congressional committee drafting and consideration of C.R.A. took place before
the Senate Banking Committee. See Hearings on S. 406, supra note 2; S. REP. No. 175, supra
note 22. The House of Representatives held no hearings on C.R.A., and there were no
comparable provisions in the House version of the 1977 Housing & Community Development
Act (of which C.R.A. is a part). W. DENNIS & J. POTTINGER, supra note 5, at 9-10.
46. See S. 406, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in Hearings on S. 406, supra note
2, at 3. "Primary savings service area" was defined as a "compact area contiguous to a
deposit facility from which such facility obtains or expects to obtain more than one-half of
its deposit customers." Id. § 3(4); S. REP. No. 175, supra note 22, at 60.
47. Bankers, bank regulators, and some senators argued that the approach was too rigid
and raised the threat of credit allocation and unsound lending practices. See Hearings on S.
406, supra note 2, at 314-15 (statement of A.A. Milligan, on behalf of American Bankers
Association), 12 (letter from Comptroller of the Currency); Additional Views of Senators
Morgan, Tower, Garn, Lugar, and Schmitt, in S. REP. No. 175, supra note 22, at 81-85. An
additional objection was that focusing on ratios of local deposits to local loans would not
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Less extreme forms of credit allocation, however, are so well-
established they are no longer controversial. The government in many
ways promotes results which would not occur in the economists'
hypothetical free market. Residential real estate finance has been a
particular favorite of the federal government. The Federal Home
Loan Bank Act49 established our system of savings and loan associ-
ations for the primary purpose of providing residential real estate
loans.50 Originally, in fact, savings and loan associations were re-
stricted to lending exclusively on real estate within a very short
geographic radius of a deposit-taking office. 5'
Secondary market agencies such as the Federal National Mortgage
Association ("Fannie Mae") and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Association ("Freddie Mac") were established to divert capital into
real estate finance that otherwise would be invested in other sectors
of the economy. 2 The Federal Housing Administration and the
Veterans Administration home loan programs are further examples
of government involvement in real estate finance for purposes that
are considered socially desirable.
benefit some of the neighborhoods that were most in need of increased lending, and also too
poor to deposit enough funds to meet their own housing credit needs. Also, it was argued,
focusing on the extent of lending near deposit-taking offices would permit or even encourage
lenders to maintain offices only in wealthy neighborhoods. See Hearings on S. 406, supra note
2, at 251, 265 (statement of Garth Marston, Chairman of F.H.L.B.B.), 15 (letter from F.D.I.C.),
294 (statement of M. Todd Cooke, president of Philadelphia Savings Fund Society), 299 (state-
ment of Ronald Grzywinski, a Chicago banking executive).
48. The Senate Committee Bill, S. 1523, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 401-406 (1977), imposed
no ratios but did refer to "primary savings service area." Id. § 404(1); S. REP. No. 175, supra
note 43, at 60. The Conference Committee Bill, H.R. 6655, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 801-806
(1977), substituted the phrase "entire community." Id. § 804(1). For analysis of this aspect
of the legislative history, see McCluskey, supra note 31, at 38-41.
49. Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 73-304, 47 Stat. 725 (1932)
(codified in scattered sections of Titles 12 and 18 of the United States Code).
50. According to Garth Marston, Chairman of the F.H.L.B.B., "Congress has long since
determined that the nation's mortgage credit and housing needs are well served by the creation
and support of specialized housing credit financial institutions, the savings and loan industry."
Hearings on S. 406, supra note 2, at 239, 242.
51. Id. at 239, 246 (prepared Statement of Garth Marston, Chairman, F.H.L.B.B.).
Mortgage lending by a federal thrift institution was limited to real estate within 50 miles of
its home office, until amendments to the Act in 1964 raised the limit to 100 miles. Pub. L.
No. 88-560, § 901a, 78 Stat. 769 (1964). Further amendments in 1970 added the language "or
within the State in which such home office is located," Pub. L. No. 91-351, §§ 706, 709, 84
Stat. 450 (1970), and in 1978 eliminated the geographic restriction, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §
1701, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978). See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464 Historical Note (1980).
52. Moran, The Federally Sponsored Credit Agencies: An Overview, 71 Fed. Res. Bull.
375 (1985) (describing the Federal Home Loan Banks, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and similar
agencies). "The sponsored agencies are expected to facilitate a more desirable outcome at
times when market forces might allocate credit in ways that are not socially optimal." Id.
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Whether such federal efforts are properly designated as "credit
allocation" is a matter of interpretation. Clearly, however, the con-
cept of federal government influence on private credit decisions
originated many decades prior to the Community Reinvestment Act
of 1977.
II. A NEW MANDATE: THE ACT AND ITS ENFORCEMENT PROCESS
A. The Legislative Concept and Requirements
The C.R.A. was a compromise between the demands of community
groups for rigid credit allocation and the denial by bankers and
regulators that any problem meriting legislative attention existed.
More importantly, it was an effort to guide private investment
decisions in a manner deemed socially responsible, while avoiding
the economic inefficiencies and bureaucratic intrusiveness of some
federal regulatory schemes. Congress sought to preserve private con-
trol over specific private institutional lending decisions, but to influ-
ence the attitudes, norms, and behavior of the decision-makers.
The brief two-page Act imposed no formulas, quotas, or specific
standards. The primary congressional sponsor of C.R.A. stated ex-
plicitly that no rigid form requirements of credit allocation were
intended.5 3 Instead, the legislation announced the previously contro-
versial principle that "regulated financial institutions have continuing
and affirmative obligation [sic] to help meet the credit needs of the
local communities in which they are chartered. '54 The four federal
supervisory agencies were directed to "encourage" those institutions
to conform to that principle, "consistent with the safe and sound
operation of such institutions." 5  The core of the C.R.A. is the
following provision:
In connection with its examination of a financial institution, the
appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency shall-
(1) Assess the institution's record of meeting the credit needs of
its entire community, including low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and sound operation
of each institution; and
53. Senator Proxmire, the primary congressional sponsor of C.R.A. stated: "this was not
a credit allocation plan and I certainly don't see it that way. Whatever we can do to prevent
it from being a credit allocation bill I want to do." Hearings on S. 406, supra note 2, at 154.
54. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (1982).
55. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1982).
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(2) Take such record into account in its evaluation of an appli-
cation for a deposit facility by such institution.1
6
This formulation obviously is vague and imprecise. The terms
"credit needs" and "entire community" are not defined. The phrase
"consistent with safe and sound operation" leaves the door wide
open for assertions by depository institutions that any greater lending
in its community would be unsafe and unsound. The direction to
the agencies to "take such record into account" permits the agencies
to approve applications for deposit facilities despite a finding that
an institution is not meeting the credit needs of its community, if
other considerations militate in favor of approval.57 No specific
conduct by financial institutions is either directly prohibited or di-
rectly required.
Because of these characteristics, C.R.A. is routinely lambasted by
its critics as being so vague as to be nearly meaningless. Nearly every
commentator discussing C.R.A. points out its lack of specificity. 8
Those criticisms are accurate, as far as they go, but they overlook
the central significance of C.R.A. The Act settled the core philo-
sophical dispute over whether depository institutions enjoying the
benefits of federal charters and federal deposit insurance 9 owe any
duty to consider the impact on neighborhoods when determining its
lending policies. The C.R.A. was a legislative mandate for a change
in policy and an unmistakable rebuke to financial institutions and
the federal supervisory agencies that had previously sanctioned and
even encouraged redlining. 60
56. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1982).
57. The Federal Reserve Board has stated explicitly that such factors may result in ap-
proval of a bank's application despite an unsatisfactory C.R.A. record. Information Statement
Re Community Reinvestment Act, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 30 (1980).
58. Commentaries on the Act routinely note the lack of specificity. See, e.g., Healey, A
Banker's Guide to the Community Reinvestment Act, 96 BANIKINa L.J. 705, 707 (1979)
(vagueness prompts speculation as to how the Act will be interpreted and enforced); W. DENNIS
& J. PoTrINGER, supra note 5, at 9-12 ("CRA itself is somewhat vague and ambivalent on its
face"). T. ButYNAx, THE COMfUNrTY RE;vESTMENT ACT: EARLY EXPERIENCE AND PROBLEMS:
ECONOMIC COMMmrrARY 2 (Fed. Res. Bank Clev. Apr. 20, 1981) ("CRA lacks specific
direction"); R. BRANDEL & M. LARGE, supra note 29, at 4 ("no definite guidance as to
precisely what is to be achieved" and no "standards of conduct"); McCluskey, supra note
31, at 33; Note, supra note 22, at 130-32.
59. Among other benefits, federally supervised depository institutions are protected from
competitive forces by federal restrictions on entry into the industry and federal ceilings on
interest rates that may be paid on savings accounts. They have access to low-cost credit
through the Federal Reserve and Federal Home Loan Banks. Hearings on S. 406, supra note
2, at 9 (statement of Senator Proxmire).
60. Wisniewski, supra note 38, at 383-407; Dennis, The Community Reinvestment Act of
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B. The Regulatory Framework and Criteria
The sparse provisions of the C.R.A. have been supplemented,
during the ten years since enactment, by a series of regulations,
examination procedures, and policy statements issued by the federal
financial supervisory agencies. Additional guidance is provided by
published rulings on specific requests for regulatory approval of
branch offices and other changes.
The basic regulatory framework was jointly developed by the four
agencies.6' In so doing, these agencies were seeking to promote
uniformity and to minimize the possibility that depository institutions
might modify their charters in such a way as to transfer to the
jurisdiction of an agency perceived as having a more permissive
policy on C.R.A. enforcement. 62 The four agencies promulgated
regulations63 and examination procedures 64 that are identical except
for minor technical and procedural variations.6 5
1977: Defining "Convenience and Needs of the Community," 95 BANKING L.J. 693, 700
(1978). See also Note, The Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: Another Attempt to
Control Redlining, 28 CATm. U.L. REv. 635 (1979).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
62. Comptroller of the Currency Robert Bloom, for example, noted that: "any agency
taking a significantly stronger approach to CRA issues in handling applications for structure
changes, would run a serious risk of losing banks through conversions. And of course, bank
regulators, just as Mr. Dooley's Supreme Court, 'follow the election returns."' R. BRANDEL
& M. LARGE, supra note 29, at 23 (citing AMEIAN- BANKER, Aug. 14, 1978, at 26). A similar
dynamic applies to bank regulation by states. In New York, for example, a large number of
banks converted from state charters to federal charters to take advantage of more liberal
federal regulatory provisions. The state responded by liberalizing its own rules. Note, supra
note 22, at 136-37 (citing N.Y., TEM. ST. COMM'N ON BANmIG, INs., & FIN. SERvs., REPORT
OF TIM COmpIaSSION 20-23, 70-73 (1984)). New York's own provision regarding community
credit needs operates by making the federal C.R.A. (both the legislation and the regulatory
rules) applicable to state-chartered banking institutions, thereby avoiding the possibility of
differences in standards. Id. at 131, 144; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 28-b(3) (McKinney Supp.
1986); N.Y. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 3, § 76-3 (1984).
63. 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.1-.8, 28.101 (1986) (Comptroller); 12 C.F.R. §§ 228.1-.8, .100 (1986)
(Federal Reserve); 12 C.F.R. §§ 345.1-.8, .101 (1986) (F.D.I.C.); 12 C.F.R. §§ 563.3-.8 (1986)
(F.H.L.B.B.). The regulations have remained virtually unchanged since their effective date in
November 1978. CON. ADV. CouN., TEE FEDERAL RESERVE'S IMPLEMENTATION OF TEE COM-
MNrrY REINVESTMENT ACT OF 1977 1.1 (Bd. Gov. Fed. Res. Sys. Aug. 1983) [hereinafter cited
as CON. ADV. COON., FEDERAL RESERvE'S IMPLEMENTATION OF C.R.A.]. For a description of
the process of drafting the regulations, see id., Appendix C, The Evolution of Regulations for
C.R.A. The only significant modification of the regulations was a special provision for banks
that predominantly serve military personnel. 44 Fed. Reg. 18,163 (1979).
64. Uniform Community Reinvestment Act Examination Procedures were approved in
1980 by the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council, an organization of the four
agencies. See, e.g., FEDERAL REsERvE SYsTEm COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 11.1.38-54. This is the
first time the agencies have combined to create uniform procedures. Id. at 11.1.38.
65. 43 Fed. Reg. 47,144 (Oct. 12, 1978). Because the four sets of regulations are
substantively identical, future citations will refer to only one set, that of the F.H.L.B.B.
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The record-keeping and mechanical requirements of the regulations
are quite limited and not significantly burdensome. 66 Each regulated
institution must (1) delineate its communities, 67 (2) adopt a "Com-
munity Reinvestment Statement" (hereinafter C.R.A. Statement), 68
(3) maintain a file of public comments available for inspection by
any member of the public,6 9 and (4) post a notice in its lobby.70
Although not particulary time-consuming or expensive to prepare,
these documents are critical in defining and monitoring the institu-
tion's performance.
The delineation of communities is of key importance because it
defines the areas within which the institution will be held accountable
for providing satisfactory and nondiscriminatory credit services. Ear-
lier proposals would have established a statutory formula for the
delineation, or would have delegated the function to the regulatory
agencies.71 The actual regulations leave the decision to the regulated
institutions, subject to review by the supervisory agency.72 An insti-
tution may be tempted to delineate its community in a manner that
is inordinately narrow or gerrymandered to exclude neighborhoods
the bank considers undesirable. Alternatively, an institution might
designate an area that is so large that it unreasonably dilutes the
effect which the institution may have on any more discrete neigh-
borhood within the area. 73 Attention to the needs of "low- and mod-
66. The Director of the Federal Reserve System's Division of Consumer and Community
Affairs stated that "CRA does not involve burdensome operational regulations." Garwood,
Regulatory Reform and Consumer Financial Services, 38 Bus. LAw. 1295, 1308 (1983).
67. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.3 (1986).
68. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4 (1986). The Statement contains a map of the community, and a
list of the types of credit the institution proposes to make available. The regulation's require-
ments may be satisfied in the space of a brochure printed on both sides of a single page. See,
e.g., The Dime Savings Bank of New York, Community Reinvestment Statement-New York
City and Long Island Area (July 1, 1980).
69. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.5 (1986).
70. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.6 (1986). The prescribed language of the notice states that the public
has a right to obtain a copy of the Community Reinvestment Statement, inspect the files, and
complain to the institution and its regulator.
71. The Senate Committee's version of the bill which became C.R.A. defined a "primary
savings service area." S. 1523, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 404 (1977). The agencies argued for
administrative flexibility. Hearings on S. 406, supra note 2, at 13.
72. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.3(a), (b)(3) (1986). Depository institutions are cautioned against
arbitrarily excluding lowand moderate-income neighborhoods from their delineations. 12 C.F.R.
§ 563.3(a) (1986). See also the agencies' uniform C.R.A. Examination Procedures, in FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM CoMPLIANcE MAiuA 11.1.43-45 (1983). In practice, the supervisory agencies
appear to prefer "nice circles" emanating from the deposit-taking facility. W. DENNIs & J.
PoriNGER, supra note 5, at 10-3.
73. Figures from a 1976 study of redlining by four Bronx thrift institutions are illustrative.
If their community was defined as the Bronx, the lending record of the four institutions would
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erate-income neighborhoods" is clearly at the heart of C.R.A.'s
expectations, even though the Act also refers to the "entire com-
munity." 74 Designation of the community, therefore, is a primary
focus of the agencies' review and of community groups' protests. 75
The C.R.A. Statement specifies types of credit to be offered, and
may also describe the overall program to ascertain and help meet
credit needs. 76 Institutions are accountable, first, for developing a
reasonable plan and, second, for providing those services equitably
to all segments of the community, including the low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods.
To assess the record of performance of a particular institution,
the agencies established twelve criteria 77 phrased in rather general
terms. The twelve criteria include the institution's program to com-
municate with members of the community and market its credit ser-
vices; the institution's extension of credit for housing, small business, and
small farms; the geographic distribution of credit applications and
be relatively poor: only 10, 18, 19, and 28 percent, respectively, of their loans were made in
their (Bronx) community. If the community was defined as the New York metropolitan area(five boroughs and three nearby counties), however, their lending record was exemplary: 95,
88, 99, and 88 percent, respectively, of their loans went to the (metropolitan New York)
community. McCluskey, supra note 31, at 43.
74. W. DENNIs & J. PorrnrGER, supra note 5, at 9-19. The legislative history of C.R.A.
leaves no doubt that the Act was intended to improve the availability of real estate credit in
areas in which institutional lenders were historically reluctant to lend, which were usually
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. See id. at 9-14 to 9-20. The statute's language is,
"the institution's record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community, including low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods .... " 12 U.S.C. § 2903(1) (1982).
75. Community Reinvestment Act Examination Procedure, in FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
COMPLiANCE HANDBOOK 11.1.43-47 (1983); W. DENNIs & J. PoTrINGER, supra note 5, at 9-69.
76. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4 (1986).
77. C.R.A. Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,146-55 (Oct. 12, 1978). The twelve criteria
(paraphrased and summarized) are as follows:
(a) Communication with members of the community, and other activities to ascertain credit
needs.
(b) Marketing and other efforts to make the availability of credit services known in the
community.
(c) Participation by the institution's board of directors in C.R.A. policy and performance.
(d) Any practices to discourage credit applications (prescreening).
(e) The geographic distribution of credit applications, extensions, and denials.
(f) Any discriminatory or other illegal practices.
(g) The record of opening, closing, and providing services at offices.
(h) Participation in community development projects.
(i) Extension of credit for housing, small business, and small farms.(j) Participation in government loan programs for housing, small business, and small farms.
(k) Ability to meet credit needs, based on condition of the institution, the economy, and
other factors.
(1) Other relevant factors.Id at 47,148, § 25.7. Many of the factors overlap, reflecting either
their generality or the fact that the list was drafted by a committee (with members representing
the four agencies).
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approvals; and the extent of participation by the institution's board
of directors in C.R.A. policy and performance. Another factor is
the institution's financial condition, thereby reserving the possibility
that poor performance in serving credit needs will not be penalized
if the institution is financially unable to perform better. Conspicu-
ously absent is a system of weighting, or any indication of the relative
importance of the different criteria.
78
Lenders are encouraged to participate in the many programs that
are directed towards assisting low- and moderate-income neighbor-
hoods while minimizing lenders' risk.79 Examples include Neighbor-
hood Housing Services,80 Federal Housing Administration Insurance,8'
Community Development Block Grants, Urban Development Action
Grants, and the section 8 Housing System Program 2 To increase
the flow of mortgage investment capital, the secondary mortgage
market agencies such as Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae are very
important." Programs of the Small Business Administration, the
78. The omission of ranking or weighting of the twelve criteria was deliberate. Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977; Implementation: Supplementary Information, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,144-
45 (1977).
79. Summaries of such programs are contained in, e.g., Tisdale, F.H.L.B.B. Off. of
Community Inv., Programs Which May Help Meet Community Credit Needs (undated), in
DIsciPMINATIoN IN MORTGAGE CREDIT: REGULATION, LITIGATION, AND COMPLIANCE 271 (W.
Dennis & D. Glascoff, Jr., eds., Prac. L. Inst. 1979); Cos,,. OF THE CURR., PROGRAM
GUIDEBOOK TO HELP MEET Conmrry CREDIT NEEDS: A GUIDEBOOK FOR BANKS AND BANK
ExAxmTERs (1979).
80. Neighborhood Housing Services was originated by F.H.L.B.B., with subsequent par-
ticipation by the other three supervisory agencies. The program's purpose was to coordinate
concentrated cooperative efforts of several lending institutions, municipal officials, and com-
munity groups to improve target areas. The program has demonstrated considerable success,
while minimizing the risk incurred by any individual participating lending institution. Duncan,
Hood & Neet, supra note 20, at 534-39; Ryan, Redlining, ANN. Stav. AMi. L. 57, 75-83
(1977); Statement by Nancy H. Teeters, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Committee on
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, May 29, 1980, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 471 (1980).
81. By relieving the lending institution of risk of loan default, F.H.A. insurance appears
to offer an ideal solution for depository institutions under pressure to lend in neighborhoods
they consider risky. However, because F.H.A. loans may also have negative effects on
neighborhoods, see supra note 21,, the lender must be careful to avoid practices that would
violate the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and C.R.A. An example would be granting conven-
tional loans only in white or upper-income neighborhoods, and granting government-insured
loans only in black or lower-income areas. Dennis, The Dual Housing Credit Market, supra
note 19, at 314-15.
82. These programs of the Department of Housing and Urban Development are described in, e.g.,
F.H.L.B.B. OFF. OF CoMduNITY INv., LEVERAGING (undated) (copies on file at Pacific Law Journal).
83. The Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), Government National
Mortgage Assciation ("Ginnie Mae"), and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Fred-
die Mac") purchase mortgage loans from the originating financial institutions, using funds
raised by selling securities to the public. For descriptions of the relation of these programs to
C.R.A. see, e.g., F.H.L.B.B. OFF. OF COianwrsITY INv., THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
(undated); R. STAR, HOUSING AND TIE MONEY MARKET 188-93 (1975).
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Farmers Home Administration, and state and local governments offer
further possibilities for promoting C.R.A.'s purposes.
The agencies went to substantial lengths to reassure lenders that
mandatory credit allocation was not intended. The examination pro-
cedures state there are no "hard and fast rules or ratios." ' 84 The Act
does not "require financial institutions to make high risk loans that
jeopardize their safety."'8 5 Examiners were admonished not to insist
upon any specific action, such as making a certain type of loan, or
to unduly burden an institution. 6 The degree of flexibility is so great
that one commentator has wondered "whether it is a game of
regulatory hide and seek, or regulation by telepathy." 87
On completing a compliance review, an examiner prepares a nar-
rative statement, discussing each of the criteria, offering suggestions
for improvement, and reporting violations. 8 In addition, the examiner
assigns a numerical rating, which is not disclosed to the institution
(at least not formally),8 9 ranging from one, representing the best
record, to five, representing the worst. 90 This scale parallels and
supplements the one to five system used for examinations based on
financial "safety and soundness" factors.
When a depository institution applies for approval of a new office,
the supervisory agency considers C.R.A. factors as an aspect of the
"convenience and needs" formula. An application may be approved
despite an extremely unfavorable rating on C.R.A. compliance, due
to other considerations based on safety and soundness, and on
competition among financial institutions.91
C. Data Collection and Analysis
Assessment of an institutional lender's record involves a consid-
erable quantity of data, both internal and external to the subject
84. Community Reinvestment Act Examination Procedures, in FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
COMPLIANCE OHANDOOK I1.1.39.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 11.1.41.
87. W. DENNIS & J. POTnNGER, supra note 5, at 9-12.
88. Community Reinvestment Act Examination Procedures, in FEDERAL RE sERvE SYSTEM
COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 11.1.54.
89. Id. Although C.R.A. ratings are not officially disclosed to depository institutions,
informal comments by agency staff probably allow an institution to make a fairly accurate
guess.
90. Uniform Interagency Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Assessment Rating System,
in FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 11.1.55-65.
91. Legislative history supports this interpretation. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REc. S1202-03
(daily ed. Jan. 24, 1977); Hearings on S. 406, supra note 2.
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institution's documents, plus substantial effort and analytic skill. An
important starting point is the information made available pursuant
to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1977 (H.M.D.A.), which
is applicable to lenders located in metropolitan areas. 92
H.M.D.A. reports disclose the number and total amount of real
estate loans, itemized by census tract. Detail is provided on borrow-
ers' income level and racial characteristics, participation in federal
mortgage insurance programs, loans to borrowers not residing on
the property, and home improvement loans.93 H.M.D.A. data there-
fore permits an overview of the geographic and racial distribution
of an institution's loans. It may be extremely useful in identifying
patterns or raising issues for further investigation.
Data on demand for credit, however, is not included in H.M.D.A.
reports. A lender should not be faulted for low absolute levels of
lending activity in certain neighborhoods if the causes are beyond
the lender's control, such as a low level of demand for credit in that
neighborhood. The most obvious means of measuring demand is
review of the loan applications received, with the purpose of deter-
mining whether there is a pattern of rejection correlated with the
race of the applicant or the geographic location of the proposed
collateral. The limitation of this approach is that applications may
have been "pre-screened" (in violation of Equal Credit Opportunity
regulations). Bank personnel might verbally discourage blacks from
submitting loan applications, and thereby avoid a written record of
rejections.
Even if its current practices are acceptable, an institution may have
developed a reputation which discourages certain classes of potential
borrowers from applying for loans. Some banks, for example, strive
to create a public image as banks catering to high-income individuals
and businesses, not as banks seeking or willing to lend in an inner-
city neighborhood. 94 In some instances, banks actively solicit deposits
92. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1982).
93. 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (1982). More specific requirements are stated in Regulation C,
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board and enforced by all four agencies plus the National
Credit Union Administration. 12 C.F.R. § 203 (1982).
The supervisory agencies are compiling the information from individual institutions into
statistical tables for metropolitan areas. A 1980 amendment to H.M.D.A. requires the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (composed of the four agencies) to prepare tables
annually for each standard metropolitan statistical area, indicating lending patterns of depo-
sitory institutions for various categories of census tracts, grouped according to location, age
of housing, income level, and racial characteristics. Housing and Community Development
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-399, Sec. 340, § 304(0, 94 Stat. 1658 (1980).
94. See, e.g., In re: Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co., Harrisburg, Dauphin County,
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from lower and middle-income neighborhoods, but consistently omit
mention of credit services from advertising directed at those neigh-
borhoods. 95 Those same banks may actively promote mortgage lend-
ing in higher-income neighborhoods (especially suburbs), through
such means as advertising, contacts with local real estate agents, and
mailings to depositors. The result is that "demand," as measured by
credit applications, appears to be present overwhelmingly in the
higher-income neighborhoods. As a result, the regulations and the
demands of community groups place important emphasis on making
the availability of credit known through advertising and other mar-
keting efforts to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. 96
Precise measurement of credit demand that has not been expressed
in loan applications is probably impossible. Nevertheless, a number
of means are available to counter or discredit contentions sometimes
raised by lending institutions that lack of demand accounts for low
lending activity in particular neighborhoods. 97 Using sophisticated
statistical methods, data on loan patterns may be adjusted to account
for population density factors in demand. The number of applications
Pa., Application for Consent to Establish a Branch (Denial) (F.D.I.C. June 23, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as F.D.I.C. Order in re Dauphin (Denial)]; Application to Merge First Nat'l
Bank of Clermont County, Bethel, Ohio, into Soc'y Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, Cleveland,
Ohio, Under the Charter of Soc'y Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, and with the Title of "Soc'y
Nat'l Bank," at Supplement 2 (Compt. Curr. Mar. 21, 1980); Letter from John F. Downey,
Regional Administrator of National Banks, to Daniel J. Callahan, President, The Riggs
National Bank of Washington, D.C. (Apr. 23, 1981) (perception of Riggs as a "rich man's
bank"). Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Applications of Dimension
Financial Corp. to Charter 31 National Banks in 25 States (May 9, 1984), cited in Lobell,
Distribution of Consumer Financial Services-Nonbank Banks and Regional Interstate Banking
Zones, 40 Bus. LAw. 1075, 1087 (1985) (bank planned to "focus marketing efforts on upwardly
mobile individuals"; but application was nevertheless approved). In one case, a New York
bank sent Bronx residents a "Get Moving Kit" emphasizing the availability of residential
mortgage credit in suburban counties. Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 499, 501 (1982); Statement
of Roger Hayes, New York City Coalition Against Redlining, in Community Reinvestment
Act Compliance: New York City Banks, Hearing Before A Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't
Operations, House of Representatives, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 2, 5 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Hearing on C.R.A. Compliance].
95. See, e.g., Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Supplement to the Decision of the
Comptroller of the Currency to Approve the Branch Applications submitted by Mich. Nat'l
Bank of Detroit, Detroit Mich. (Compt. Curr. Apr. 24, 1980).
96. See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 47,144-55 (Oct. 12 1978); Information Statement Re Community
Reinvestment Act, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 30, 31 (1980).
97. Greater New York Savings Bank, for example, argued that the reason that only 6.5%
of real estate investments were in Brooklyn, even though 80% of its deposits were derived
there, was lack of demand. In response, a protesting community group submitted affidavits
of Brooklyn residents who had been denied credit or discouraged from applying, and they
also submitted data indicating that 50% of all single-family housing transactions in Brooklyn
were financed with seller mortgages, presumably because institutional loans were perceived as
being unavailable. W. DENNIS & J. PorriNGER, supra note 5, at 10-43.
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or of approved loans is then stated per capita or per housing unit
in different areas. 9s The loan portfolios of competing depository
institutions and mortgage bankers, and Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (H.U.D.) records of loans insured by the Federal Housing
Administration (F.H.A.) may also be used to demonstrate that other
lenders are finding demand. One technique accepted by the agencies
that provides a rough measure of unsatisfied demand is analysis of
municipal real estate registers, 99 which document each title transfer
and indicate whether a mortgage was taken by an institutional lender
or by some other party.'0 Underlying this analysis is the presumption
that transactions will generally be financed by sellers only if credit
from institutional sources is perceived to be unavailable.
Statistical analysis can also disclose racially discriminatory effects
of lending policies. Studies using census data on race, income level,
and other characteristics have compared lending levels in different
neighborhoods that have the same income level within a single city.
These studies repeatedly determined that as the percentage of blacks
in a neighborhood increases, the percentage of transactions financed
by conventional mortgages decreases.101 The supervisory agencies have
acknowledged the existence of disparities in lending activity by neigh-
borhood which-contrary to the repeated assertions of lenders-
cannot be accounted for by factors affecting demand for mortgage
credit. o2
Statistical evidence of disproportionately low levels of lending in
particular neighborhoods is rebuttable by evidence that a depository
institution has attempted in good faith to improve its lending record.
Efforts to, for example, increase lending in low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods are favorably considered even if they do not result in
early tangible success. 03
98. Canner & Cleaver, The Community Reinvestment Act: A Progress Report, 66 Fed.
Res. Bull. 87, 90 (1980) (stating that Federal Reserve staff has at times used a ratio of
mortgage loans to total transfers); National City Corp., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 545 (1981) (using
number of deed transfers as a "proxy" for demand).
99. Descriptions of related techniques, and examples of their usage are contained in
ASSESSING COWnUNTY CREDIT NEEDS: A CRA GuIDEBooK 15-27 (U.S. Dept. Hous. & Urb.
Dev. Oct. 1980).
100. See, e.g., National City Corp., 67 Fed. Res. Ball. 52 (1981).
101. NAT'L TRAIN. & INFo. CmR., A GUIDEBOOK: Holm MORTGAGE DISCLOsuRE ACT AND
REnvasTmETrr STRATEGIES (Off. Pol'y Dev. & Res., U.S. Dept. Hous. & Urb. Dev. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as N.T.I.C., GUIDEBOOK] (discussing studies in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and
several other cities).
102. Information Statement Re Community Reinvestment Act, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 30, 31
(1980).
103. The process has been described as an inverse relationship between "bottom line" and
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Application of the Act, regulations and examination procedures
thus entails consideration of a broad range of factors and large
quantities of data. The sophistication and thoroughness of the parties
accumulating and analyzing data may become as important as the
standards themselves.
III. COMMUNITY GROUPS: THE ACT'S BENEFICIARIES
AND DRiVING FORCE
The effect of C.R.A. in practice (though not in official federal
policy) depends primarily on the energy, activism, and sophistication
of community groups. Community activism affects both the conduct
of a depository institution and the degree of attention focused on
that lender by the supervisory agency. It can be no mere coincidence
that of all of the dozens of formal rulings issued by the supervisory
agencies which focus particular attention on C.R.A. issues, virtually
all involve challenges brought by community groups.' °4 It appears
"process." As the actual lending performance becomes more impressive, an institution will be
under less pressure to demonstrate that its efforts, procedures and internal controls are
consistent with C.R.A., and vice versa. W. DENNIS & J. POTTINGER, supra note 5, at 9-13 to
9-14.
104. All except four of the agencies' formal rulings mention a community group's challenge
in the text of the opinion. The exceptions are: Application of Marine Midland Bank, Buffalo,
N.Y., to Convert from a Banking Inst. Chartered Under the N.Y. Banking Law to a Nat'l
Banking Ass'n (Comp. Curr. Jan. 28, 1980). In re: Provident Savs. Bank, Jersey City, Hudson
County, N.J., Application for Consent to Establish a Branch (Denial), Statement (F.D.I.C.
Sept. 29, 1980); In re: Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Md., Riverdale, Prince Georges County,
Md., Application for Consent to Establish a Branch (F.D.I.C. Feb. 9, 1981) (plus a second
Order on another application of the same bank decided on the same day); Hutsonville Bank
Corp., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 48 (Fed. Res. Bd. 1981) (not listing the name of a protestant but
noting that "all comments received" were considered). One other ruling followed a challenge
filed not by a community group but by a competing bank. First Nat'l Boston Corp., 66 Fed.
Res. Bull. 162 (Fed. Res. Bd. 1980). See also W. DENNIS & J. POTTINGER, supra note 5, at
9-21 ("Agencies take 'tougher' positions when a protest has been filed then when an application
is unprotested. Thus, a lending practice which may be unchallenged in most circumstances
becomes the subject of official criticism when a protest is involved.")
Geographically, community group protests on C.R.A. grounds are concentrated in the
northeastern seaboard, the midwest, and California. According to a study for the Federal
Reserve Board, the 28 C.R.A. protests it received between the Act's effective date in November
1978 to December 1982 were distributed among the Federal Reserve's twelve Districts as
follows:
4 Boston 4 Chicago
4 New York 3 St. Louis
4 Philadelphia 0 Minneapolis
7 Cleveland 0 Kansas City
0 Richmond 0 Dallas
1 Atlanta I San Francisco
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likely that a similar pattern exists in cases that do not reach the
stage of a formal decision. 105
A. Relations with Depository Institutions
Beyond any doubt, one of the effects of the Act has been to
enhance the bargaining position of community groups involved in
redlifiing issues.1°6 "Arrogance" is the term that community groups
repeatedly use to describe the attitudes of some lending institutions
prior to the enactment of C.R.A. or prior to filing objections under
C.R.A. 0 7 (Bankers, perhaps not accustomed to discussing investment
policy with picketing groups of blue-collar workers'03 might well
CON. ADV. CotN., FEDERAL RESERVE'S IMPLEMENTATION OF C.R.A., supra note 63, Table
F6.3. A different study, focusing on protests received by F.D.I.C., Federal Reserve Board
(F.R.B.), and O.C.C. between enactment of C.R.A. in 1977 and September 1981, concluded
that most protests were filed in "the 'old' industrial sectors of the country." Melvin, The
First Thousand Days of the Community Reinvestment Act, J. Com. BANK LENDING 53-54
(July 1982). The states from which the largest numbers of protests originated, according to
this study, are as follows:
19 New York 5 Illinois
11 Pennsylvania 5 Michigan
10 Massachusetts 5 Wisconsin
10 Ohio 30 All other states
Id. at 54.
105. Community groups operate on the premise that "the regulators themselves are often
ex-bankers which their sympathies can reflect. Hence except in some rare cases, it usually
takes some prodding from individuals or groups to get the wheels of examination and regulation
rolling." V. BENEDEK, supra note 37, at 7. See also TRi-STATE GREENLINING, supra note 21,
at 8 ("the effectiveness of the Act will be largely determined by the extent of citizen participation
in the regulatory process"). One commentator has concluded that prodigious and persistent
efforts by community groups are the reason that C.R.A. and H.M.D.A. have been enforced
at all. Comment, Redlining, Disinvestment, and the Role of Mutual Savings Banks: A Survey
of Solutions, 9 FoRDHAMa URB. L.J. 89 (1980).
106. Community groups and supervisory agencies appear to agree that C.R.A. has provided
important new power to community groups. For statements by community groups, see, e.g.,
Statement of Roger Hayes, New York City Coalition Against Redlining, in Hearings on C.R.A.
Compliance, supra note 94, at 2; N.T.I.C., GUIDEBOOK, supra note 101, at 55. The regulatory
agencies recognize that lending institutions often negotiate settlements with community groups
to avoid delays and possible denials of application filed by the lenders with the agencies. See,
e.g., Canner, Redlining: Research and Federal Legislative Response, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 610
(1982).
107. For numerous accounts of banks refusing to negotiate and the reactions of community
groups, see V. BENEDEK, supra note 37; N.Y. PUB. INT. REs. GROUP, TAKE THE MONEY AND
RUN: REDLNING IN BROOKLYN, Two YEAgs LATER (1979) [hereinafter referred to as N.Y.P.I.R.G.,
TAKE n=- MONEY] (copies on file at the Pacific Law Journal); Healey, supra note 58, at 735-36.
108. The backgrounds and attitudes of members of several groups are described, by or
from the perspective of their leaders, in V. BENEDEK, supra note 37. The principal occupations
listed are work in steel mills, construction, trades, railroad yards, cafeterias, and the post
office, short-order cook, housewife, and domestic. Id. at 25, 28, 40, 64. Class differences with
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characterize the protesters' attitudes in a similar manner.) Requests
to meet with the management of an institution to discuss redlining
issues were frequently met with flat refusal or intransigence, according
to accounts written by community organizations. Vocal public dem-
onstrations and campaigns to withdraw deposits were a common
reaction by the groups.'09
C.R.A. has tended to bring the community groups off the streets
and into the conference rooms of lending institutions and supervisory
agencies. Groups have found that filing a challenge to an institution's
application for a branch or a merger produces marked improvements
in negotiating posture, in some instances causing banks to consider
their proposals seriously for the first time. 10
Depository institutions are most susceptible to pressure when an
application is pending before a supervisory agency. Even when no
application is pending, however, banks are virtually required to be
responsive to community groups' requests to discuss credit policy,
and even to affirmatively seek contact with the organizations in order
to assess community credit needs."' Bankers who fail to develop
bankers-described as living in suburbs and not having knowledge or concern for the institu-
tions' urban neighborhoods-are frequently voiced, and many activists take pride in accom-
plishing substantial changes in bank policy without previous background in banking. Id.
passim.
109. V. BENEDEK, supra note 37; N.Y.P.I.R.G., TAKE TBE MoNEY, supra note 107.
According to one group in Brooklyn, the president of one savings bank initially stated that
Brooklyn has "gone down the tubes" and would receive no loans from his bank, and the
president of a savings and loan association said that "Jesus Christ himself could not get a
loan in Brooklyn." After picketing, deposit withdrawal campaigns, lengthy negotiations, and
public hearings, those two associations and six others signed agreements with the protesters.
Id.
110. One recent example was an agreement by United Virginia Bank to make $10 million
in loans to low-income neighborhoods. According to Allen J. Fishbein, of the Center for
Community Change, "it was only when the bank had an appeal pending (for the acquisition
[of another bank]) that we had real leverage." Ansberry, Banks with Interstate Ambitions are
Challenged by Law Requiring Commitment to Local Lending, Wall St. J., June 26, 1986, at
58, cols. 1-5 (citing additional examples). The same result was reported, for example, by groups
challenging the Society National Bank in Cleveland, V. BENEDEK, supra note 37, at 46-47;
Northside Savings Bank in New York City, id. at 67; Shelby Federal Savings and Loan
Association in Indianapolis, id. at 72. See also W. DENNIS & J. POTINoER, supra note 5, at
10-4 (stating that community groups use protests as "levers" to bring the lender to the
bargaining table). A newspaper account provides an interesting perspective on a major Chicago
bank's program to extend $100 million in loans, below market interest rates, in lowerand
middle-income neighborhoods, and to make direct grants of as much as $400,000 to "neigh-
borhood development concerns." The bank had never previously been sympathetic to com-
plaints that it did little banking in the city's disadvantaged areas, according to a leader of
community groups, and announced its program only after the groups threatened to protest
the bank's application to the Federal Reserve Board for approval of a $275 million acquisition
of another bank. First Chicago Forms Program for Lending in City Neighborhoods, Wall St.
J., .Mar. 7, 1984, at 4, col. 4.
111. 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7, assessment factor (a); C.R.A. Examination Procedures § 8(a).
1097
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
good relations with community groups risk unfavorable ratings by
regulators, and, perhaps more importantly, challenges to future ap-
plications. These challenges can impose substantial costs, even if
ultimately unsuccessful.
For a group to be effective, it must develop expertise, devote
considerable energies to documentation, and show persistence in
negotiations. Supervisory agencies accord little weight to complaints
or assertions that are not supported by statistical or other data,"12
and they expect or encourage community groups to attempt to resolve
their differences with depository institutions by negotiation."'
In many cases, the level of sophistication of community groups
has been impressive. Multivariate regression analysis has been applied
to evaluate the geographic dispersion of loans, using H.M.D.A., deed
transfer, and census data."4 Information may also be obtained through
8-K and 10-K reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission by bank holding companies, statistics on deposits issued by
the supervisory agencies, annual reports to shareholders, "statements
of condition" to regulators, and local real estate transaction regis-
ters. 115
Although confrontation remains a strategy in redlining disputes,
many groups have come to recognize the importance of flexibility
The pragmatic importance of good community relations, and means for promoting it, is
discussed in detail in W. DENmS & J. POTrINGER, supra note 5, at 11-35.
112. Under F.H.L.B.B. standards, for example, a protest is not deemed "substantial,"
thereby entitling the protestant to a hearing, unless it is in writing, timely, and contains
"specific objections supported by reasons and facts including economic or financial data." 12
C.F.R. § 542.2(e)(4) (1986). A joint statement indicated that agency staff will investigate the
merits of the application and protest, but also said that "The agencies expect the protestants
to provide evidence to support their complaints to the extent possible. For example, information
on deed transfers may indicate mortgage loan demand ..... " Fed. Fin. Insts. Exam. Coun.,
Community Reinvestment Act Information Statement (Sept. 12, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 63,134
(1980).
113. Fed. Fin. Inst. Exam. Coun., Community Reinvestment Act Information Statement
(Sept. 12, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 63,133-34 (1980).
114. National City Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 427, 429 n.6 (1982). A computer program
for tabulating and analyzing H.M.D.A. data by zip code or census tract for neighborhood
comparisons is offered by the National Training and Information Center, which also provides
training sessions and technical assistance to local community groups engaged in C.R.A.
activities. N.T.I.C., GUIDEBOOK, supra note 101.
115. For guides to data collection and analysis, published by community action organiza-
tions, see, e.g., R. GOLDEN & J. ROSENBERG, supra note 44; NAT'L TRAIN. & INFo. CTR., PAss
THE BUCK ... BACK: THE C.R.A. HANDBOOK (1979); N.T.I.C., GUIDEBOOK, supra note 101.
In addition, H.U.D.'s Office of Neighborhoods, Voluntary Associations, and Consumer
Protection publishes documents including: H.M.D.A. AND REINVESTMENT STRATEOsES-A
GUIDEBOOK (1980); UsINa H.M.D.A. DATE FOR Co niuNrry DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE-
A GUIDEBOOK (1980); ASSESSING CO%=tmrry CREDIT NEEDS: A C.R.A. GUIDEBOOK (U.S. Dept.
Hous. & Urb. Dev. 1979).
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and negotiation with banks, so that mutually acceptable results can
be reached." 6 Community groups sometimes withdraw their chal-
lenges or even take affirmative steps to recommend the approval of
a lender's application to supervisory agencies." 7
B. Goals and Results
The demands made by community groups generally focus on
increasing mortgage and home improvement lending within their
neighborhoods." 8 Groups often demand commitments from lending
institutions to provide real estate loans in a particular neighborhood
in a prescribed amount or to accept a prescribed percentage of
deposits drawn from that neighborhood." 9 This approach has been
rejected by Congress and by the supervisory agencies, but nevertheless
is occasionally successful. Some banks have agreed to provide specific
types of loans on specific terms. 20 Also, community groups often
116. See, e.g., the accounts of several antiredlining campaigns in V. BENEDEK, supra note
37, at 23, 24, 100, passim. Interviews with both community group and supervisory agency
staff members confirmed the point that the most common and successful strategy for community
groups and banks is negotiation in private settings. Telephone conversation with Tom Schraw,
National People's Action, Chicago, Illinois (July 3, 1985); telephone conversation with James
W. Lowell, Community Affairs Coordinator, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs,
F.R.B., Washington, D.C. (July 3, 1985). They agree also that the federal agencies sometimes
facilitate or arrange such meetings, and that results should be publicly announced not as
antiredlining agreements but rather as cooperative initiatives for community improvement. Id.
117. In several cases before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for
example, community groups reached negotiated settlements with banks, and withdrew their
protests. Trust Co., 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 669 n.1 (1979); Landmark Bankshares Corp. (decided
Nov. 30, 1979, per Canner, The Community Reinvestment Act: A Second Progress Report,
67 Fed. Res. Bull. 813 (1981), but not otherwise reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin);
Mid-Continent Bancshares, Inc. (decided Nov. 9, 1979, per Canner, The Community Rein-
vestment Act: A Second Progress Report, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 813 (1981) but not otherwise
reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin); Girard Co., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 916 (1981); First
Nat'l Bank of Allentown (decided Aug. 28, 1981, per Canner, The Community Reinvestment
Act: A Second Progress Report, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 813 (1981), but not otherwise reported in
the Federal Reserve Bulletin). Gaining community groups support of an application has been
stated as a goal of bank public relations efforts. Healey, supra note 58, at 737.
118. The goals and results of many community group protests to C.R.A. applications are
described in W. DENNIS & J. POTTrIGER, supra note 5, at 10-7 to 10-16 (F.H.L.B.B.), 10-23
to 10-33 (F.R.B.), 10-37 to 10-39 (O.C.C.), 10-42 to 10-48 (F.D.I.C.).
119. G. CANNER, THE CozmmUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND CREDIT AILCATION 3-4 (Staff
Study 117, Bd. Govs. Fed. Res. Sys. 1982) [hereinafter cited as G. CANNER, CREDIT ALLO-
CATION].
120. See, e.g., Loan Policy Agreement between Perpetual Federal Savings and Loan
Association, Washington, D.C., and several community groups, reprinted in NEIGHBORHOOD-
BASED REINVESTMENT STRATEGIES: A CRA GUIDEBOOK, Appendix F. (U.S. Dept. Hous. &
Urb. Dev. Oct. 1980). The lender agreed to offer conventional and F.H.A./V.A. loans on
specific types of property, with specific terms and creditworthiness standards, and specific
priorities during periods of limited funds. The community groups agreed to withdraw their
protest with the F.H.L.B.B., and not undertake a depositor boycott or proxy challenge. In
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focus on increasing advertising and other efforts to market credit
services in their neighborhoods.
Additional concerns of community groups include obtaining fi-
nancing for special projects, establishing procedures for review of
rejected loan applications, and a variety of other goals which were
perhaps not originally anticipated by Congress.12 1 One central-city
community group, for example, sought contributions from a bank
to turn vacant lots into mini-parks, noting that the bank made large
charitable contributions to the local orchestra and garden center.'2
Another group included in its C.R.A. protest charges of discrimi-
nation in employment practices.'2 A group of tenants obtained
agreements from lenders to enforce clauses in existing mortgages
requiring the mortgagors/landlords to maintain and repair their build-
ings. The lenders also agreed to lend additional amounts to the
landlords if -necessary, and to allow the tenants some input into
lending decisions involving the determination of who their landlords
would be.124
In summary, the C.R.A. has provided community groups important
new power. They now have standing to formally participate in the
process of regulatory examination of institutions, a significantly
another instance a savings and loan association acquiesced to protestors' demands that it
commit 10% of deposits to specific types of loans. F.H.L.B.B. Board members were uncom-
fortable with the quota, but chose not to interfere with the agreement. Community Federal
Savings & Loan-St. Louis, Mo., Res. No. 79-204, discussed in W. DENNIS & J. POTTINOER,
supra note 5, at 10-7 to 10-10. Another bank committed specific funds for real estate lending
with a 1% reduction in interest rates in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. In re:
Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co., Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Pa., Reconsideration of
an Application for Consent to Establish a Branch (F.D.I.C. Dec. 8, 1980) [hereinafter cited
as F.D.I.C. Order in re: Dauphin (reconsideration)]. Other examples are cited in G. CANNER,
CREDrr ALLOCATON, supra note 119, at 7-8.
121. See, e.g., N.T.I.C., GUmEBOoK, supra note 101, at 24; NEIGHBORHOOD-BAsED REIN-
vEsTMENT STRATEmS: A CRA GuiDEBooK 42-58, 67-75 (U.S. Dept. Hous. & Urb. Dev. Oct.
1980) (describing the goals and results of several community group protests). See generally the
issues discussed in the formal opinions issued by supervisory agencies, described infra at part
V, of which almost all were prompted by community group action.
122. V. BENEDEK, supra note 37, at 44-45 (involving Society National Bank in Cleveland).
The community group also was able to prove that the bank granted home improvement loans
directly to homeowners in higher-income areas, but not in low- moderate-income areas. In
the disfavored areas, the bank would only purchase homeowners' notes from a building
contractor. The result was that the lower-income residents were forced (since they had no
other financing available) to deal with a particular contractor whose work was said to be
shoddy and overpriced. Id.; Society Nat'l Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 351 (Fed. Res. Bd. 1980).
See also V. BENEDEK, supra note 37, at 96 (involving two San Diego thrift institutions).
123. National City Corp., Cleveland, Ohio, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 52 (1981) (employment
practices ruled to be outside of scope of C.R.A.).
124. N.T.I.C., GUImEBOOK, supra note 101, at 91. See also V. BENEDEK, supra note 37,
at 64.
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enhanced posture for negotiation with lending institutions, and op-
portunities to influence the policy of both lenders and regulators. In
exercising these powers, some groups have shown considerable ex-
pertise, energy, and imagination.
IV. Ti EFFECT ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
The responses of banks and savings and loan associations to
C.R.A. have been varied. At minimum, C.R.A. has added a new
element to institutions' relations with their regulators and with com-
munity groups. At maximum, C.R.A. has promoted major changes
in lending policy.
A. Incentives to Comply
The single sanction readily apparent on the face of the C.R.A. is
not, in practice, the direct cause for changes in lending policy. The
Act provides that a depository institution's record in meeting com-
munity credit needs must be considered by the supervisory agencies
before approving an application for a merger, acquisition, or office
change. 125 After a decade of experience with administration of the
Act, it is safe to say that poor C.R.A. performance will not result
in denial of an application except in the most extreme, egregious
cases, and perhaps not even then. The number of denials on C.R.A.
grounds is miniscule and, for at least one of the supervisory agencies,
zero. 26
Other factors, however, cumulatively provide substantial incentives
to depository institutions. Principal among those factors are delay in
processing the application, adverse publicity, and embarrassment.
A protest by a community group to an application results in
protracted investigation and hearings by the supervisory agencies. 127
125. 12 U.S.. 2903.
126. Statistics on applications denied by each of the agencies, and analysis of the instances
involved, are contained in part V of this Article.
127. In the Federal Reserve System, for example, applications typically are decided in an
average of 3.7 months, but protested applications take between 3 and 13 months, with the
usual case lasting 6 months. The F.R.B. is concerned that community groups could "impose
expensive delays on applicants in order to extricate agreements .... ." G. CANNR, CGEDrr
ALLoCATION, supra note 119, at 5, 5 n.22. Delay occurs even if the protest turns out to be
groundless, because of the need for notification periods, and the increased agency scrutiny.
See Note, Commercial Bank Mergers: The Case for Procedural and Substantive Deregulation,
95 HARv. L. REv. 1914, 1916-18, 1927 (1982) (noting that judicial review is rarely sought
because the prospects of additional delay and major expense causes the parties to a merger to
abandon the deal).
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The delay in processing may cause arrangements for the planned
acquisition of real estate to lapse, planned construction to be dis-
rupted, or competition from other institutions to arise. At minimum,
the lender will be denied, for a period, the business advantages
comtemplated, such as an increase in market share or deposits.
Publicity resulting from an investigation or from a community
group protest can only have adverse effects on a bank or savings
and loan association. Public relations and image are important to
depository institutions. 121 Perhaps the most important, though un-
quantifiable, factor is the discomfort experienced by the management
of depository institutions when accused of violating federal law and
being derelict in their community responsibilities. In addition to
stigma among social associates, management is compelled to explain
to the board of directors of a depository institution why the appli-
cation has not received timely processing, and why the institution's
prestige and business opportunities are at risk. 29
At one time, management could and did argue that fiduciary duty
to the shareholders and depositors compelled a lending policy that
was not concerned with impact on a particular neighborhood. 30 As
a result of C.R.A., that argument is discredited, and the economic
realities are reversed. Currently, failure to be concerned with impact
on a particular neighborhood constitutes a breach of the responsi-
bilities of management. The only available arguments, now, are that
management has done enough in that direction.
The effect of criticism from regulatory agencies also should not
be underestimated, despite the unlikelihood that the agencies will
128. As one illustration, fears of negative publicity caused a Tennessee bank to withdraw
an application with the O.C.C. The bank's chief executive officer was concerned that denial
of the application, caused by C.R.A. reasons, would be misinterpreted by the public, since
the Comptroller does not announce his reasons. W. DENNIS & J. POTMGNER, supra note 5, at
10-40.
129. Derivative actions against management for loss of a valuable business opportunity
through negligence are even a possibility. Healey, supra note 58, at 737 (citing remarks of
Neal L. Peterson, General Counsel, Federal Reserve Board, reported in AL BANKER, Jan.
26, 1979, at 6); W. DENNIS & J. PoTTINGER, supra note 5, at 11-11.
130. See, e.g., Statement of Grover J. Hanson, Chairman, First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Chicago, in Hearings on S. 1281 before Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1978), cited in Note, Redlining: Should Local
Government Become Involved?, 10 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 243, 249 (1977); Earthman, Residential
Mortgage Lending: Charting a Course Through the Regulatory Maze, 29 VAND. L. REv. 956,
980-84 (1976) (discussing the potential liability to management of institutions which made
socially-responsible high-risk loans, due to the lack of clear authority for such a policy); Willie,
A Regulator's View of Banks in Community Development, 29 VAtD. L. REv. 935 (1976) (in
which the Chairman of the F.D.I.C. conceded that past examination procedures discouraged
rehabilitation or development loans).
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outright deny an application. Depository institutions are subject to
extensive and sometimes highly discretionary supervision throughout
their operations. 31 "Suggestions" and "encouragement" from su-
pervisory authorities, even when not explicitly coercive, are taken
seriously.1 2 C.R.A. has tended to reverse the nature of supervisory
criticism. Where once the agencies would criticize for lending locally
(if higher returns were available elsewhere), now the agencies will
criticize for failing to lend locally.133
The dangers of noncompliance with C.R.A. are especially clear
for institutions planning interstate expansion or other acquisitions.' 34
Any institution, however, has some incentive to comply. Even rela-
tively minor decisions, such as relocating an office, trigger C.R.A.
reviews, and cannot always be predicted. Economic conditions change
over time, as do business decisions and philosophies. When an
application is filed, review entails consideration of the record not
only during the year of application but also in previous years.
Inattention to C.R.A. in one year may therefore jeopardize future
options. 135
131. One representative of the thrift industry noted, in regard to C.R.A. implementation,
that "the supervisory agencies have rather awesome powers and broad discretion in the exercise
of those powers. This is particularly true with respect to examinations, the approval of mergers
and acquisitions, and the approval of applications for new deposit facilities." R. Dockson,
Testimony on Behalf of the California Savings and Loan League and the Conference of
Federal Savings and Loan Ass'ns on the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, before the
Comptroller of the Currency, F.D.I.C., F.H.L.B.B., and F.R.B., 13 (Apr. 13, 1978).
132. This factor arose repeatedly in interviews by the author of officials of the four federal
regulatory agencies. A member of the Federal Reserve Staff, for example, described major
changes in the conduct of several banks on issues related to C.R.A., due to supervisory
pressure and persuasion applied over several years. Telephone conversation with James W.
Lowell, Community Affairs Coordinator, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs,
F.R.B., Washington, D.C. (July 3, 1985).
133. See Scott, The Patchwork Quilt: State and Federal Roles in Bank Regulation, 32
STAN. L. REv. 687, 696-97 (1980); S. REP. No. 175, supra note 22, at 33-35.
134. A depository institution that expects to file an application for approval of a merger,
acquisition, or office change is more exposed to pressure than one that does not foresee any
transaction that would trigger the requirement for regulatory approval. Note, Legislating
Against Mortgage Redlining: The Need for a Firmer Commitment, 12 RUTGERs L.J. 151, 180
(1980); Comment, Redlining, Disinvestment, and the Role of Mutual Savings Banks: Survey
of Solutions, 9 FoR, DHAim URB. L.J. 89 (1980). In states with "unit banking" laws, in which
branching is not possible regardless of an institution's C.R.A. record, C.R.A. may have less
effect. W. DENNmS & J. POTTINGER, supra note 5, at 9-5.
135. W. DFNris & J. POTTINGER, supra note 5, at 11-7. Also, at least one agency has
suggested that disregard of C.R.A. might lead to adverse consequences even when no application
was pending or contemplated. F.H.L.B.B. officials stated that a savings and loan association
following that policy "is probably not in compliance with the nondiscrimination requirements"
based on the "effects test," and could be subject to a cease and desist order. C.R.A.
Examination Procedures Discussed, 3 ON Tm Homa FRONT, No. 2, at 2 (F.H.L.B., San Fran-
cisco 1982) (copies on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
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As a result of all of these factors, depository institutions have
strong incentives to be attentive to the record of C.R.A. compliance
that they are developing, and responsive to the requests of community
activists. Even the threat of a protest tends to bring depository
institutions to the bargaining table. 36
B. Costs and Effects
Institutions have demonstrated substantial ingenuity in developing
community investment strategies. In a broad variety of permutations,
institutions have embarked on programs to lend in declining neigh-
borhoods for construction, purchase, or rehabilitation, and to offer
these loans at favorable rates. Counselling services or special consid-
eration is provided for loan applicants who might otherwise be
denied, and efforts are made to stimulate loan applications from
some neighborhoods. 1 7 Some banks have formed consortia for con-
centrated lending in target communities, thereby reducing the risk
assumed by each lender. 38 Many banks have participated in revital-
ization programs subsidized or assisted in a variety of manners by
local and federal governments, but relying principally on private
136. Ansbury, supra note 110, at 58, cols. 1-5 (reporting comments by a Federal Reserve
official, community groups, and bankers).
Interviews with both community group and supervisory agency representatives emphasized
that one of the primary aspects of a community group's leverage or negotiating power is the
delay that could arise in the processing of a bank's application if the group files a protest.
Telephone conversation with Tom Schraw, National People's Action, Chicago, Illinois (July
3, 1985); telephone conversation with James W. Lowell, Community Affairs Coordinator,
Division of Consumer and Community Affairs Coordinator, Division of Consumer and
Community Affairs, F.R.B., Washington, D.C. (July 3, 1985). See also V. BENEDEK, supra
note 37, at 52 (delay of four months in application of Society National Bank in Cleveland),
67 (delay of 15 months in case of Northside Savings Bank of New York, leading to a dramatic
change in policy by the bank and withdrawal of opposition by the community group), 98
(mere threat of delay lead to quick concessions due to competition before the regulator from
two other institutions applying for a branch in the same location).
137. For description of such efforts see Dennis, The Dual Housing Credit Market, supra
note 19 (including 28 examples of policies or programs instituted by banks under C.R.A.
pressure); D. Manro & L. ROSSER, SAVINGS AND LOAN SERVICE CORPORATIONS AS INSTR.AENTS
OF REINVESTMENT (Woodstock Inst. 1977); M. ADAms & L. RossER, ColemrNir DELOPMENT
SUBsIDIARIEs OF BANK HoLn~o ComPANIEs As VEmcms OF REINVESTMENT (Woodstock Inst.
1977), reprinted in Dennis, The Dual Housing Credit Market, supra note 19, at 338-59.
138. One example is the Crown Heights Revitalization Group formed by 14 New York
City banks to stimulate investment and to operate an office that assists potential borrowers in
"packaging" applications for multi-family rehabilitation and other types of loans (i.e. assem-
bling and organizing the necessary data into a formal and complete presentation). Also in
New York, 26 savings banks are members of a program which reconsiders loan applications
which have been denied, and grants them if the denial is considered improper. MORTOAOE
REvmr FunrD (brochure, undated, obtained in 1981) (copies on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
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capital. 1 9 Lenders also use programs operated by Federal Housing
Administration (F.H.A.), Veterans Administration (V.A.), and Small
Business Administration (S.B.A). Of course, many of these strategies
do entail greater administrative effort and expense than the lenders
would prefer.
The record-keeping burden imposed directly by C.R.A. is quite
limited. The only paperwork that is mandated is the C.R.A. State-
ment (usually only a few pages), and the duty to maintain a file of
comments received from the public. Nevertheless, the fact that C.R.A.
activities are subject to regulatory review prompts some banks to
maintain additional documentation. Advisors to lending institutions
recommend preparation of extensive documentation of all factors
that reflect favorably on the bank in a C.R.A. review. For example,
institutions are counselled to prepare a response to every negative
comment in the public file, to consider ways "to generate honestly
deserved favorable comments," and to document all contacts with
community groups.'4° In addition, depository institutions may be well
advised to record the factors considered in delineating the community
to be served and the credit services to be provided, and to document
any C.R.A. training given to staff.
V. THE FEDERAL SUPERVISORY AGENCIES
C.R.A. mandated, and has begun to accomplish, a shift in the
attitudes and policies of the four federal financial supervisory agen-
cies. The mission of the agencies, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, the Comptroller of Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the Federal Reserve Board, had always been to
assure that depository institutions serve the "convenience and needs"
of their communities.1 4' Prior to C.R.A., however, the agencies
139. See, e.g., F.H.L.B., N.Y., PROGRESS THROUGH PARTNERSHIP, A REPORT ON CoMMxNrrY
INVESTMENT AcTVrri N DISTRICT 2 (N.Y., N.J., P.R.), June 1978 to Dec. 1979 (no date) (stating
that approximately 99 savings and loans nationally were participating in the F.H.L.B.B. Communi-
ty Investment Fund, providing dozens of examples) (copies on file at the Pacific Law Journal);
Dennis, The Dual Housing Credit Market, supra note 19 (providing 21 examples).
140. W. DENNIS & J. POTTINGER, supra note 5, at 9-24. Accord Healey, supra note 58.
However, a Federal Reserve staff member with years of experience in C.R.A. matters stated
that only a very few banks (usually very large ones) maintain documentation beyond what is
minimally necessary. Telephone conversation with James W. Lowell, Community Affairs
Coordinator, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, F.R.B., Washington, D.C. (July
3, 1985). One community group reported, in regard to a particular savings and loan association,
that "every time they talked to one person in the neighborhood, they recorded it." V.
BENEDEK, supra note 37, at 16.
141. The "convenience and needs" formula is used in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1816 (1982) (for
certificate to do business), 1828(c)(5) (for mergers), 1942(c) (for acquisition of bank shares).
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interpreted this mission as requiring an exclusive focus on financial
"safety and soundness," promoted by pursuit of maximum income
consistent with very limited risk, for the benefit of the institution's
depositors and shareholders. 142 Thus, for example, if a depository
institution located in New York (and originally chartered for the
purpose of serving the "convenience and needs of its community"), 43
could earn a higher interest rate on real estate loans in California,
the supervisory agencies would criticize the institution for failing to
export capital. 144 The detrimental impact on local loan applicants and
local neighborhoods simply did not enter the equation.
In the congressional hearings that led to C.R.A, the agencies made
their attitudes and orientations clear. They agreed that depository
institutions that do not meet community credit needs exist, but could
not cite a single example of an institution being denied an application
for that reason. 145 The agencies opposed the notion that matters of
social policy or neighborhood improvement were within their mis-
sion. 146
These attitudes of the management and staff of the supervisory
agencies appear to be changing as a result of C.R.A., though the
rate of progress ranges between slow and glacially slow. Enforcement
of C.R.A., like enforcement of civil rights and consumer protection
statutes, is often considered inconsistent with the agencies' traditional
142. Scott, The Patchwork Quilt: State and Federal Roles in Bank Regulation, 32 STAN.
L. REv. 687, 696-97 (1980); S. REP. No. 175, supra note 22, at 33-35.
143. See supra notes 50 & 51 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., statements by Garth Marston, Chairman of the F.H.L.B.B. in the hearings
on C.R.A. Hearings on S. 406, supra note 2, at 239, 248, 266 ("In 1974 the usury limit in
the District [of Columbia] was 8 percent. In Virginia and Maryland, it was 10 percent. Why
lend money in the District?"). Expressing a similar view, the Federal Reserve Board described
the ability of a multibranch bank to use deposits received in one area to make loans elsewhere
as an advantage, not a disadvantage. Midland Bank Ltd., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 729 (1981).
145. Hearings on S. 406, supra note 2, at 397 (statement of Senator Proxmire, commenting
on the testimony presented at the hearings).
146. Id. at 236 (Prepared Statement of Garth Marston, Chairman, F.H.L.B.B.). Similarly,
in hearings two years prior to enactment of C.R.A., the agencies discounted the incidence of
redlining and denied that depository institutions had any obligation to lend in their own
neighborhoods. Home Mortgage Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 1281 Before the Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975). According to the F.H.L.B.B.,
for example, "evidence of intentional discrimination against specific areas has been elusive at
best," and "thrift institutions are wisely under no legal obligation to invest in any given
neighborhood." Id. at 594, 597, 600 (statement of Thomas Bomar, Chairman, F.H.L.B.B.).
According to the Federal Reserve, "[tlo insist that capital should not flow out of a lender's
market is to risk inhibiting ... economic growth in the nation as a whole." Id. at 20, 21
(letter from Arthur F. Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System).
According to F.D.I.C., "there is serious question whether banks should be encouraged to
make real estate loans in certain deteriorated neighborhoods .... ." Id. at 19 (letter from
Frank Wille, Chairman, F.D.I.C.).
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concentration on "safety and soundness," and is assigned a low
priority. 47
The agencies have taken steps to obtain necessary data for C.R.A.
reviews. Most agencies, for example, require depository institutions
to maintain registers or logs of loan applications, which provides a
basis for analysis of lending policy according to racial characteristics,
income levels, and neighborhoods. 148 "Geocoding" of approved loans
is used to analyze the geographic distribution of loans, with particular
attention to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, and to neigh-
borhoods with minority populations. In most agencies, computerized
systems are used to identify statistical disparities that justify particular
attention by bank examiners. 149 The agencies also assist lending
institutions in using federal programs which permit them to increase
lending in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods without incurring
excessive risk or accepting below-market rates of return. 150
147. A survey by F.D.I.C. of F.R.B., O.C.C., and F.D.I.C. managers and examiners in
1979 found that compliance with consumer protection laws and regulations was considered to
be the least important aspect of examinations. GEN. AccT. OFF., EXAMINATIONS OF FmNA ccIA
INSTITUTIONs Do NOT ASSURE COMPLIANCE wITH CONSMrIER CREDTn LAWS 7 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as G.A.O., STuDY]. In 1980, some managers and examiners expressed similar views, and
also concerns regarding limited career opportunities in their consumer compliance role. Id. at
8. The Chairman of F.D.I.C. indicated that the agency was aware of the concerns and was
working to change the perceptions. Letter from Irvine H. Sprague, Chairman, F.D.I.C., to
William J. Anderson, General Accounting Office (Oct. 24, 1980), reprinted in id. 49, 55. A
study for the F.R.B. in 1978 found widespread perceptions among examiners that enforcement
of civil rights law might be inconsistent with their efforts to maintain the safety and soundness
of banks, was not considered highly important by the Federal Reserve Board, and would not
materially advance the examiners' careers in the System. W. DENaNs, THm DETECTION AND
CORRECTION OF CREDIT DISCRIMINATION: A REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GovERNoRS OF THE
FEDERAL REsERvE SYsTEm 9 (1978). Five years later, in 1983, another study of F.R.B. staff
found that few compliance examiners "feel comfortable" advising banks to improve C.R.A.
performance, and several "thought that their performance in these areas was limited by the
attitude of the management of their Reserve Banks." CON. ADV. CouN., FEDERAL REsERvE'S
IzPLEMENTATION OF C.R.A., supra note 63, at 4.6.
148. Loan application registers or logs, including information on racial characteristics, are
required routinely by F.H.L.B.B. and F.D.I.C., and are required in special cases by O.C.C.,
but are not required by F.R.B. J.R.B. Assocs., PREPARED FOR FEDERAL FNAcrAL INsTITUTIONS
EXAMNATION CouNcr: SECTION 340(e) FAIR HousING LENDING STUDy: FINAL REPORT, at S-2(unpublished report July 30, 1982) [hereinafter cited as SECTION 340(e) REPORT]; 12 C.F.R. §§
338.4 (1986) (F.D.I.C.), 528, 6 (F.H.L.B.B.), 27 (O.C.C.).
149. F.H.L.B.B. has an automated Loan Application Register System (LARS), F.D.I.C.
has a Computer Assisted Supervisory System (COMPASS), and O.C.C. has a Fair Housing
Home Loan Data System (FHHLDS). F.R.B. has no computerized system for reporting and
processing data relevant to discrimination in lending policy regulated depository institutions.
SECTION 340(e) REPORT, supra note 148, at S-2, 3-1 to 3-5. The Federal Financial Institutions
Examinations Council, in response to § 340(e) of the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-399 (1980), has prepared a study of the feasibility of a single
system to be used by all four agencies. Id.; Fed. Fin. Insts. Exam. Coun., Fair Lending and
Community Reinvestment, 47 Fed. Reg. 41,421, 41,422 (1982).
150. See, e.g., COMPT. CiUR., PROGRAm GUIDEBOOK TO HELP MEET COhMuNrIY CREDIT
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Beyond these basic administrative measures, however, the C.R.A.
compliance program appears to be extremely limited. Among the
most powerful forms of "encouragement" would be suggestions or
informal communications from agency staff to lender management,
particularly in the course of periodic bank examinations. In actual
practice, however, these enforcement powers are rarely used. Separate
studies by the General Accounting Office,' 5' a congressional subcom-
mittee,5 2 and others,'5 3 have found that neither informal contacts
nor examination reports are regularly and effectively used to promote
C.R.A. compliance.
The supervisory agencies' bank examiners tend to focus on tech-
nical or procedural requirements, such as proper posting of required
notices. They direct inadequate attention to the far more difficult,
time-consuming analytic task of identifying geographic discrimination
and other practices violative of C.R.A.'s basic purposes.5 4 Bank
examiners typically have not contacted community groups, thus limiting
their review to data supplied by the bank. 55 This policy was only
NEEDS: A GUIDEBOOK FOR BANKS AND BANK ExAminNERs (1979) (describing dozens of such
programs).
151. G.A.O., STUDY, supra note 147.
152. Hearing on C.R.A. Compliance, supra note 94.
153. Ctr. for Community Change, Neighborhood Revitalization Project, Adequacy of
C.R.A. Enforcement, reprinted in Hearing on C.R.A. Compliance, supra note 94, at 172
[hereinafter cited as Ctr. for Community Change, Adequacy]; Statement of Howard Golden,
President of the Borough of Brooklyn in Hearing on C.R.A. Compliance, supra note 94, at
8. The Brooklyn President, whose office has made substantial comment on almost every
application for expansion of a bank in Brooklyn, concluded that "the intent and mandate of
CRA was not sufficient to overcome the historic reluctance reguators have to seriously question,
pressure, and force banks to operate in the community interest." Id. at 9.
154. G.A.O., STUDY, supra note 147; Ctr. for Community Change, Adequacy, supra note
153; CON. ADV. CoUN., THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S IMPLEMENTATION OF C.R.A., supra note 63.
The General Accounting Office stated:
Our conclusions are based principally on the lack of documented analysis, such
as a comparison of rejected loans to accepted loans, analysis of monitoring infor-
mation for real estate related loans, and the use of HMDA data for geocoding
(plotting approved loans on a delineated map of the institution's community) to
assess CRA.
G.A.O., STUDY, supra note 147, at 5-6. The study's findings as to C.R.A. enforcement was
qualified by the notation that data on C.R.A. enforcement was limited, because the law was
recent, but the findings were nevertheless consistent with patterns of enforcement of the Equal
Credit Opportunity, Fair Housing, and Truth in Lending Acts. Id. The community group
found that C.R.A. examinations "concentrate on technical (and) largely inconsequential aspects
of compliance." Ctr. for Community Change, Adequacy, supra note 153. The F.R.B.'s advisory
council, in its study of the agency's compliance examiners and community affairs officers,
"recurrently encountered mere technical compliance with the law; that is, doing no more than
is necessary." CON. ADV. CouN., FEDERAL RESERVE'S IMPLEMENTATION OF C.R.A., supra note
63, at 3.3.
155. G.A.O. STUDY, supra note 147; Ctr. for Community Change, Adequacy, supra note
153.
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recently changed.Y5 6 When violations are identified, compliance tech-
niques are mild and permissive, rarely going beyond mere moral
suasion. 5 7
Ultimately, the coercive aspect of C.R.A. becomes most apparent
in formal decisions on applications for branches or mergers. These
decisions, which are publicly disclosed, perform a function compa-
rable to that of judicial decisions, interpreting a statute and applying
it to concrete fact situations. The formal rulings of the agencies are
156. The Federal Reserve reported, for example, that, in 1982, its examiners conducted
1,271 interviews with government officials, community groups, and trade associations, in
connection with consumer compliance examinations. BD. Gov. FED. REs. Sys., 69TH ANN.
REP. 159 (1983). Nevertheless, a survey of community leaders by the F.R.B.'s advisory council
in 1983 found that 94% of the respondents knew about C.R.A. and were actively involved in
community development, but only 30% had ever been contacted by the F.R.B.'s community
affairs officers. CON. ADV. CouN., FEDERAL RESERvE's IMPLEMENTATION OF C.R.A., supra
note 63, at 4.5.
157. G.A.O., STUDY, supra note 147; Ctr. for Community Change, Adequacy, supra note
153. According to the General Accounting Office, the agencies continued to rely on moral
suasion even after persistent violations, commonly simply repeating their ineffective efforts,
without even using a more strongly worded letter or request for evidence of correction. Id. at
34-35. In response to these findings, the F.D.I.C. noted that legal proceedings are expensive,
and that "supervisory pressures brought to bear over a period of time" frequently produce
the desired result. Letter from Irvine H. Sprague, Chairman, F.D.I.C. to William J. Anderson,
G.A.O. (Oct. 24, 1980), reprinted in G.A.O., STUDY, supra note 147, at 49, 57.
According to a community group report, there is "overwhelming rating inflation of CRA
examiantions," with less than five percent receiving ratings less than satisfactory, and even
those receive no supervisory follow-up between examination cycles. Ctr. for Community
Change, Adequacy, supra note 153. Data released by the Federal Financial Instituitons
Examinations Council on C.R.A. ratings issued in 1983 tends to support that conclusion. The
data combines the ratings issued by F.R.B., F.D.I.C., and O.C.C, which used the same
adjectives to describe each rating, and can be summarized as follows:
C.R.A. Rating Number Percentage
I - commendable, need no further improvement 1,099 20.2%
2- satisfactory, but may need further encourage-
ment 4,4145 76.3%
3 - less than satisfactory 173 3.2%
4 - much less than satisfactory 10 0.2%
5 - unsatisfactory 2 0.0%
ToTAms 5,429 100.0%
Data for the F.H.L.B.B., which assigned different adjectives to the same numerical scale, was
described in text format that can be summarized as follows:
C.R.A. Rating Number Percentage
1 - outstanding*
2 - good* 91 4.2%
3 - satisfactory 2,050 95.1%
4 - needs improvement 13 0.6%
5 - unsatisfactory 1 0.0%
TOTALS 2,155 100.0%
* Data for ratings I and 2 were not separately stated. LENDERS Com-Tmrry INv. REP., CRA
AGGREGATE RATINGS PUBLISHED BY BANK REcULATORS 3 (Community Inv. Publ., Silver Spring,
Md. Sept. 1984).
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particularly crucial because of the extremely imprecise nature of the
C.R.A. They inevitably send messages to the banking industry as to
the types of conduct that are deemed unacceptable by the regulatory
agencies, and the consequences to be expected.
Denial or conditional approval of a bank application is certainly
not the only, nor even necessarily the most effective, means of
promoting compliance. Nevertheless, the record of formal rulings is
an important element in assessing the agencies' commitment to en-
forcing C.R.A., and is watched carefully by the banking industry.
To date, in most agencies, the incidence of formal sanctions is so
minimal as to suggest that a noncomplying depository institution
faces no significant danger of denial of an application to branch out
or merge. In the years since the effective date of C.R.A., the nation's
thousands of regulated depository institutions have filed thousands
of applications, including approximately 100 that were formally pro-
tested. The number denied or conditionally approved on C.R.A.
grounds by all four agencies is minimal, perhaps only four. The
number approved subject to conditions is only slightly larger, perhaps
twenty-eight.58
158. The two compilations of data on disposition of depository institution applications
involving significant C.R.A. issues produced somewhat differing results, probably due to
differences in format and methodology. A community organization offers data that can be
summarized as follows:
F.D.I.C. F.H.L.B.B. F.R.B. O.C.C
Denied 3 0 0 1
conditions 0 23 1 3
Comments of Allen J. Fishbein, Director, Neighborhood Revitalization Project, Center for
Community Change, in Con. Adv. Coun., Bd. Gov. Fed. Res. Sys. Discussion of Current
Credit Conditions and the Community Reinvestment Act 9 (unpublished Apr. 29, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Discussion]. A study prepared for the F.R.B. produced the following data
on applications involving significant C.R.A. issues between October 1977 and March 1982:
F.D.I.C. F.H.L.B.B. F.R.B. O.C.C.
Denied 3 0 0 1
Approved with 8 8 7
conditions or
commitments 3
Approved with- 18 11 26
out conditions or
commitments 19
Withdrawn 2 Not. avail. 0 2
Withdrawn fol- 9 7 7 5
lowing negoti-
ated agreements
CON. ADV. CoIN., FEDERAL REsERVE's IMPLEMENTATION OF C.R.A., supra note 63, Table
F6.1. Whichever set of figures is accepted, it is clear that the number of applications receiving
unfavorable action is miniscule in relation to the total number of applications considered.
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To consider the supervisory agencies as a whole, however, is
insufficient. Analysis of the publicly-available data regarding the
policies and the results of the C.R.A. enforcement programs indicates
distinctly divergent patterns among the four agencies.
A. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (F.H.L.B.B.) regulates sav-
ings and loan associations, which have traditionally represented the
primary institutional source of residential mortgage credit, 59 a major
focus of C.R.A. In comparison to the other federal regulatory agencies,
the F.H.L.B.B. has demonstrated exceptional vigor and commitment
to effectuating the policies embodied in the C.R.A. Its success,
however, has been seriously impeded by the severe financial difficulties
experienced by savings and loan associations in recent years (problems
more serious than those facing other branches of the banking industry).
The investment portfolios of savings and loan associations consisted
overwhelmingly of residential mortgages with long terms and fixed
interest rates. 160 The associations, therefore, suffered severely as
rapidly rising interest rates and new competition from money market
funds caused income from old loans to fall below the expense of
attracting new deposits.' 6' Profitability of the savings and loan in-
dustry began a steady decline in 1978, becoming negative in 1981
and 1982. Hundreds of savings and loan associations were forced
into dissolution or into merger to avoid dissolution. 162 A modest
Using as an example a single agency in a single year, the F.R.B. considered 1,597 applications
in 1982. Id. at 1.2.
159. In 1976, the savings and loan industry originated approximately 55% of all institutional
home mortgage lending. 1981 ANN. REP., 15 FED. Houa LoAN BANK BD. J., No. 4, 22 (1982).
By 1981, however, due to severe economic problems this percentage was down to eight percent.
Id.
Although the F.H.L.B.B. has authority in some respects over all thrift institutions having
federal charters or federal deposit insurance, its authority under C.R.A. is limited to those
with federal charters. State-chartered associations, representing approximately half of the assets
held by all savings and loans in the nation, do not require the F.H.L.B.B.'s approval to open
new branches, even if they have federal deposit insurance. W. DENNiS & J. POnnioER, supra
note 5, at 9-5, 10-5.
160. Moran, Thrift Institutions in Recent Years, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 726 (1982).
161. Excellent summaries of the causes and effects of the severe problems encountered by
thrift institutions are in 1982 ANN'. REP., 16 FED. Hosm LoAN BANK BD. J., No. 4 (1983);
and Moran, Thrift Institutions in Recent Years, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 725, 726 (1982).
162. Mahoney & White, The Thrift Industry in Transition, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 137, 138
(1985). In 1982 alone, there were 446 mergers, including 167 directed by the F.H.L.B.B.-an
unprecedented number. 1982 ANN. REP., 16 FED. Hosm LoAN BANK BD. J., No. 4, at 4
(1983).
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recovery began in 1983 and 1984, but earnings are still well below
the performance of the early 1970s. 163
An economic environment more adverse for initial implementation
of C.R.A. could hardly be imagined. A depository institution threat-
ened with economic collapse clearly cannot be expected to aggressively
market credit services that might aggravate the problem. Moreover,
it would be pointless to promote mortgage credit in low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods when prevailing market interest rates are so
high that even most high-income families cannot afford to borrow. 164
Despite the circumstances, the F.H.L.B.B. has acted with some
vigor to implement C.R.A. The Board is the only one of the four
supervisory agencies to commit its own funds for C.R.A.-oriented
lending. A "Community Investment Fund" of ten billion dollars
advances funds to savings and loan associations for specific com-
munity investment projects, at an interest rate of one-half percent
below the otherwise prevailing Federal Home Loan Bank rate. The
participating association bears the risk of default by the ultimate
borrower. 165 The program has been described as "by far the biggest
'carrot' so far devised to encourage reinvestment," accompanying
the C.R.A. "stick." 166
The F.H.L.B.B. has taken the lead, among the four supervisory
agencies, 67 in issuing nondiscrimination requirements addressing a
variety of practices associated with redlining.165 The intent is to limit
the basis of lending decisions to objective criteria demonstrably
related to creditworthiness of the applicant and value of the property
offered as security, and to exclude all unsubstantiated assumptions
about groups and areas. 169
163. Mahoney & White, The Thrift Industry in Transition, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 137, 137
(1985). See also Moran, Thrift Institutions in Recent Years, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 726 (1982).
164. The average effective mortgage commitment rate offered by thrift institutions in
October 1981 was over 18%. 1982 ANN. REP., 16 FED. HomiE LOAN BANK BD. J., No. 4, 23-
24 (1982).
165. NAT'L TRAm. & INFo. CmR., PAss TE BUCK ... BACK: Tnn C.R.A. HANDBOOK 115
(1979).
166. Id. For a description of projects and results, see 1982 ANN. Rm., 16 FED. Hoi.M
LoAN BANK BD. J., No. 4, 34-37 (1982).
167. S. REP. 175, supra note 43, at 33.
168. 12 C.F.R. §§ 528, 531 (1986). Prior to C.R.A., the F.H.L.B.B. had established a
reputation as the most active of the four agencies in antidiscrimination efforts. Searing, supra
note 39, at 1127-43; Lamb, supra note 28, at 411.
169. 12 C.F.R. § 531.8(b), (c) (1986). Building age and location data may not be used as
a basis for discouraging or refusing to accept a loan application, 12 C.F.R. § 528.3 (1986);
denying a loan or discriminating in fixing any of its terms or conditions, 12 C.F.R. § 528.2(a)
(1986); and may not be used in a discriminatory manner in appraisal, 12 C.F.R. § 528.2a(a)
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Use of age or location of the collateral as factors in the appraisal
and loan review process is severely restricted. 170 Excluded from con-
sideration are the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of the
loan applicant and of other persons in the dwelling or its vicinity.
The Board further cautions that consideration of the income level of
the area in which the collateral is located can lead to discrimination
against minorities .171
The F.H.L.B.B. applies the "effects test"'72 of discrimination both
to loan underwriting standards and to more general decisions con-
cerning the types and terms of loans to be offered. A lending standard
that is discriminatory in effect may not be used, even in the absence
of actual intent to discriminate, unless it "achieves a genuine business
need which cannot be achieved by means which are not discriminatory
in effect or less discriminatory in effect.' ' 7
Thrift institutions are cautioned about "credit rationing," a term
the Board uses to describe such measures as restricting the types of
loans offered, requiring larger down payments, and increasing the
credit requirements for approval of a loan application. The institu-
tions are to evaluate whether any such measures have a dispropor-
tionately negative impact on particular groups or areas, even if
unintended or not immediately apparent. 74
Formal rulings on applications submitted by thrift institutions point
to all of these regulations, which connect closely with the C.R.A.
standards. Although the Board has not yet issued any denials of
applications on C.R.A. grounds, this fact in context does not dem-
onstrate laxity in enforcement. F.H.L.B.B. staff informally advise
savings and loan associations of the likelihood of unfavorable action
(1986).
The F.H.L.B.B., it has been noted, is the only one of the four agencies to regularly use
the term "redlining" without quotation marks and without any implication that it may not
exist. W. DENNs & J. PoTTINGER, supra note 5, at 10-7.
170. 12 C.F.R. § 528.2(a) (1986).
171. 12 C.F.R. § 531.8(c)(6) (1986).
172. The "effects test," as developed in Supreme Court decisions (based on legislation
other than C.R.A.) "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form but discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971). Once the plaintiff shows a discriminatory effect, the burden shifts to the defendant to
prove a sufficient business justification of the practice. Id. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
173. 12 C.F.R. § 531.8(b) (1986).
174. Statement on Credit Rationing, F.H.L.B.B. Res. No. 79-547 (Nov. 1, 1979), 44 Fed.
Reg. 65,182-83 (Nov. 9, 1979). The Statement was promlted by "periods of economic
stringency," but since every financial institution always "rations" credit in the sense of
selecting a finite number of investments from among a much larger number of opportunities,
the Statement should have general applicability.
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by the Board. The associations withdraw applications likely to be
denied, thereby avoiding formal public denial. 75 Withdrawal under
such circumstances accomplishes the same purpose as denial.
Resolutions of the Board commonly contain "conditions" to ap-
proval, or approve an application "provided that" specified measures
are adopted by the savings and loan association. More than seventy
resolutions have contained such provisions, which typically require
corrective action within a specified short period of time. 76 The most
common requirement is affirmative lending and marketing directed
towards low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.' 7  Some associa-
tions are required to reexamine the delineation of their communities
and make appropriate changes.178
Many associations are instructed to alter credit rationing policies
which are discriminatory in effect. Some of those policies are facially
neutral but tend to perpetuate past patterns of discrimination. Ex-
amples include policies to lend only to previous customers, 79  to
charge increased interest rates or fees for loans in certain geographic
areas, 180 to apply arbitrary standards of "remaining economic life"
of a building,18' or to consider applications for conventional loans
175. Telephone interview with Tom vall, Director, Office of Community Investment,
F.H.L.B.B., Washington, D.C. (May 12, 1982). Mr. Wall indicated that the institution takes
steps to improve its C.R.A. record before submitting another application.
176. The Resolutions and institutions affected include the following:
F.H.L.B.B. Res. No. 79-348 (May 14, 1979) (State Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, Beatrice,
Neb.); F.H.L.B.B. Res. No. 79-367 (June 21, 1979) (First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, Toledo,
Ohio); F.H.L.B.B. Res. No. 79-637 (Dec. 13, 1979) (Northwestern Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
Clay Center, Kan.); F.H.L.B.B. Res. No. 80-124 (Mar. 3, 1980) (American Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, Lynchburg, Va.); F.H.L.B.B. Res. No. 80-352 (May 29, 1980) (Biscayne Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, Miami, Fla.); F.H.L.B.B. Res. No. 80-460 (July 24, 1980) (Continental Say.
Ass'n, Freeport, Tex.); F.H.L.B.B. Res. No. 80-493 (Aug. 15, 1980) (Freedom Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, Worcestor, Mass.); F.H.L.B.B. Res. No. 80-539 (Aug. 21, 1980) (Midwest Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, Jamaica, N.Y.); F.H.L.B.B. Res. No. 80-618 (Sept. 30, 1980) (Reliance
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Jamaica, N.Y.); F.H.L.B.B. Res. No. 80-638 (Oct. 8, 1980) (Austin
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Chicago, Ill.); F.H.L.B.B. Res. No. 80-721 (Nov. 10, 1980) (Capitol
City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Washington, D.C.) (copies on file at the Pacific Law Journa).
Subsequent citations will be to Resolution Number only. Reports of the General Counsel,
in the F.H.L.B.B.'s Annual Reports, indicate much larger number of conditional approvals:
26 in 1982, 17 in 1981, and 30 in 1980. 1982 ANN. R.i., 16 FED. Homi LoAN B NK BD. J.,
No. 4, at 33 (1983); 1981 ANN. REP., 15 FED. Hoim LoAN BANK BD. J., No. 4, at 41 (1982);
1980 ANN. REP., 14 FED. Hoam LoAN BANK BD. J., No. 4, at 43 (1981).
177. See, e.g., Res. Nos. 79-367, 80-124, 80-352, 80-460, 80-638, 80-721, supra note 176.
178. See, e.g. Res. Nos. 80-493, 80-539, supra note 176.
179. Res. No. 79-367, supra note 176 (customer-only policy was to be abandoned outright
in specified census tracts, and continued in the remainder of the community only if no less-
discriminatory means could be found to achieve the same business need); Res. No. 79-637,
supra note 176.
180. Res. Nos. 79-348, 79-637, 80-638, supra note 176.
181. Res. No. 80-618, supra note 176.
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with high loan-to-value ratios only upon special request.8 2 Finally,
some associations are admonished to increase lending in low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods"" and to consider offering additional
types of loans.'14 The F.H.L.B.B. has not hesitated to specify nec-
essary changes in a depository institution's lending criteria and pro-
grams.'8
5
The policy on granting hearings to community groups on C.R.A.
matters is fairly liberal. Any person who files a "substantial" protest 6
and makes a timely request will be granted an opportunity for oral
argument "at a time and place reasonably convenient to the prot-
estants." 18
7
Overall, the F.H.L.B.B.'s record of C.R.A. enforcement appears
to be the most vigorous of the four agencies. Commitment to the
policies of C.R.A. is demonstrated in the investment of F.H.L.B.B.
funds for community development projects, regulations addressing
racial and geographic discrimination in housing credit in great detail,
and rulings on applications submitted by regulated thrift institutions.
Although the program is impeded by serious economic problems of
the savings and loan industry, the effort is being made.
B. Comptroller of the Currency
In the first few years after C.R.A.'s enactment, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (O.C.C.), which is responsible for
supervision of national banks, issued several formal rulings on bank
applications8 8 that indicated an active program of enforcement. More
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Res. No. 80-352, supra note 176; Res. No. 80-539, supra note 176 (thrift
institution near an Indian reservation was required to lend on the reservation, unless it could
demonstrate that the tribal court did not provide a forum for enforcement of security interests).
184. See, e.g., Res. No. 80-493, supra note 176 (thrift institution was to consider offering
loans with a loan-to-value ratio up to 95%).
185. W. DaNNis & J. PorriNoER, supra note 5, at 10-11 (noting the contrast between
F.H.L.B.B. and F.R.B. policies).
186. A protest (whether based on C.R.A. or any other grounds) is "substantial" if it is
in writing, seasonably filed, and contains specific objections supported by reasons, facts
(including relevant economic or financial data), and a description of any adverse effects on
the protestant which may result from approval of the application. 12 C.F.R. § 543.2(e)(4)
(1986). However, an application based on C.R.A. "shall not be considered insubstantial merely
because of the form in which it is submitted." 12 C.F.R. § 543(e)(5) (1986).
187. 12 C.F.R. § 543.2(f) (1986).
188. The public record of rulings is limited, because of O.C.C.'s policy of issuing decisions
publicly only when they represent "a new or changed policy or presents issues of general
importance to the public or the banking industry." 12 C.F.R. § 5.13 (1986). Only eight
decisions relating to C.R.A. have been made public. Letters from Robert W. Hefner, Director,
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recent rulings have not been publicly released, making assessment of
current enforcement efforts difficult.
Between 1978 and 1981, at least four applications were denied,
and at least eleven were approved subject to conditions.'89 Other
applications were withdrawn by the applicant bank (perhaps to avoid
Consumer Examinations Division, Comptroller of the Currency, Washington, D.C., to the
author (Aug. 31, 1982 & June 28, 1983). The documents, in chronological order, are as
follows:
1. In re: The Greater N.Y. Say. Bank, N.Y., Kings County, N.Y., Application for Consent
to Establish a Branch (Denial) (F.D.I.C. Apr. 23, 1979) (Decision Statement of the Director,
Comptroller of the Currency) (favoring conditional approval instead of denial). In this
document, the Comptroller was acting in his capacity as member of F.D.I.C., Board of
Directors.
2. Application to Merge Bank of Ind., Nat'l Ass'n, Gary, Ind., into Ind. Interim Nat'l
Bank (Organizing), Gary, Ind., Under the Charter of Ind. Interim Nat'l Bank, and with the
Title of Bank of Ind., Nat'l Ass'n (Compt. Curr. Nov. 2, 1979) (denial).
3. Application of Marine Midland Bank, Buffalo, N.Y., to Convert from a Banking Inst.
Chartered Under the N.Y. Banking Law to a Nat'l Banking Ass'n (Compt. Curr. Jan. 28,
1980) (approval).
4. Application to Merge First Nat'l Bank of Clermont County, Bethel, Ohio, into Soc'y
Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio, Under the Charter of Soc'y Nat'l Bank of Cleveland,
and with the Title of "Soc'y Nat'l Bank" (Compt. Curr. Mar. 21, 1980) (approval).
5. Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Supplement to the Decision of the Comptroller of
the Currency to Approve the Branch Applications Submitted by Mich. Nat'l Bank of Detroit,
Detroit, Mich. (Compt. Curr. Apr. 24, 1980) (approval).
6. Application to Merge Bank of Ind., Nat'l Ass'n, Gary, Ind., into Ind. Interim Nat'l
Bank (Organizing), Gary, Ind., Under the Charter of Ind. Interim Nat'l Bank, and with the
Title of Bank of Ind., Nat'l Ass'n (Compt. Curr. Aug. 18, 1980) (conditional approval).
7. Letter from John F. Downey, Regional Administrator of National Banks, to Daniel J.
Callahan, President, The Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. (Apr. 23, 1981) (conditional
approval) (copies of 1-8 on file at Pacific Law Journal).
8. Letter from Joe Selby, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Operations, to Board of Directors,
American Fletcher National Bank & Trust Co., Indianapolis, Indiana (June 19, 1981) (condi-
tional approval).
The documents listed above will be cited hereinafter simply as "Decision," followed by the
most distinctive word in the bank's name, and the year of decision if necessary for clarity,
along with the item number.
189. The Office of the Comptroller has prepared summaries of the disposition of bank
applications raising C.R.A. issues between 1978 and June 1933. Letters from Robert W.
Hefner, Director, Consumer Examinations Division, Comptroller of the Currency, Washington,
D.C., to the author (Aug. 31, 1982, with summaries enclosed, and June 28, 1983, stating that
his office had no additional information). That data may be reduced to the following chart:
Protested Nonportested Total
Approved 28 8 36
Conditionally ap- 4 11
proved 7
Withdrawn 4 - 4
Denied 1 3 4
Totals 40 15 55
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unfavorable action by the Comptroller), 190 and some were approved
only after the objections of "protestants" were satisfied.' 9' Particu-
larly significant is the fact that the Comptroller identified selected
bank applications for special attention on C.R.A. matters as a matter
of internal agency procedure, rather than limiting its role to reacting
to protests lodged by community groups.' 92 O.C.C. appeared to apply
the "effects test" of discrimination. 93 Moreover, the agency consid-
ered the burden of proof in resolving protests to be on O.C.C. itself,
rather than on the protestor or the bank. 94
The impact that firm supervisory enforcement of C.R.A. can have
on lending institution policy is clearly illustrated by two of the early
decisions of the Comptroller, relating to two applications for approval
of a merger filed by the Bank of Indiana. In response to the first
application, the Comptroller found that "the bank has not demon-
strated an affirmative approach to any CRA assessment factor."' 195
The bank had shown clear tendencies to direct credit to the suburbs
but not to the city, had engaged in discriminatory lending policies,
and persisted in Equal Credit Opportunity violations even after being
cited in Comptroller examinations. 96 The Comptroller was not mol-
190. Id. Of the four protested applications withdrawn by the banks, one did so by agreement
with a community group, and another coverted to a state charter. Information regarding the
other two was not provided.
191. In at least three cases in which protested applications were approved, community
groups reached an agreement with the bank and/or withdrew the protest.
Society Bank, as one example, altered its home improvement loan policies, reached an
agreement with the protesting community group and agreed to consult with it in the future,
and initiated an active program to market credit in underserved areas. Decision, Society, supra
note 188, no. 4 (C.R.A. Supplement). The community group's account of the negotiating
process is at V. BENEDEK, supra note 37, at 54.
In another case, Michigan Bank developed an affirmative marketing program, and promised
to acquire and staff a "C.R.A. mobile unit" to ascertain and meet local credit needs and to
meet with community groups. Decision, Michigan, supra note 188, no. 5. In both cases, the
Comptroller indicated that the banks would be monitored in terms of the actions promised.
192. V. BENEDEK, supra note 37, at 103. O.C.C. denied at least three applications and
conditionally approved four others in situations in which no protests were filed by community
groups. See supra note 189. The Bank of Indiana case represented the first denial by any of
the four agencies entirely on its own initiative. W. DENNs & J. POTrINGER, supra note 5, at
10-37.
193. Under O.C.C. guidelines, examiners interviewing bank personnel are instructed to
"[d]etermine whether bank policies regarding evaluation [of loan applications] have been
reviewed under the 'effects test."' W. DENNIS & J. PoTTiNGER, supra note 5, at App.-328.
Moreover, when the O.C.C. identified disproportionately low levels of lending in lowand
moderate-income neighborhoods, as in the Bank of Indiana case, it required the bank to
increase its marketing efforts in the neighborhoods, even without proof of intentional discrim-
ination. See infra note 201; W. DENNIS & J. Po-rnboER, supra note 5, at 10-37.
194. Decision, Indiana (1979), supra note 188, no. 2, at 4.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. Decision, Indiana (1979), supra note 188, at 3. More specifically, the Comptroller found
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lified by cosmetic improvements and commitments undertaken by the
applicant during and immediately before the Comptroller's consid-
eration of the application. The application was denied. 197
Nine months later, Bank of Indiana reapplied, presenting a record
of major reforms and meaningful commitments for future improve-
ments.' These steps included active solicitation of loan applications
from low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, surveys of credit needs,
numerous meetings with community leaders, seminars for urban small
businesses, elimination of discriminatory practices, and commitments
of major sums for inner-city loans. This second application was
approved, conditioned on still further improvement. 99
When applications were conditionally approved, the reason com-
monly given was that an analysis of the bank's geographical distri-
bution of loans indicate disproportionately low levels in low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods. The fact that few applications for
credit were received from those neighborhoods is not a sufficient
explanation; the bank was required to agree to increase its marketing
efforts to elicit demand for credit from the disfavored neighbor-
hoods. 200 The Comptroller also insisted that a bank's commitment to
modify its policies to help meet the credit needs of its community
involve the highest levels of management. 20 1
The applications that did receive full approval often showed evi-
dence of similar policy changes by the applicant banks. Decisions of
the Comptroller that approved applications often indicated that the
bank improved its program for marketing credit services in less-
wealthy areas, improved dialogue with community organizations, and,
in some instances, reached agreement with protesting groups.
Decisions on bank applications involving C.R.A. issues have not
been publicly released since 1981 and the statistics indicate that none
have been denied. 2 2 One interpretation is that enough applications
"no evidence of meaningful communication with members of the community," "no marketing
or special credit-related programs," policies tending to discourage loan applicants from "credit
availability between the city of Gary and its surrounding suburban communities," and "dramatic
disparities" for housing-related credite between lower-income and higher-income census tracts. Id.
197. Id. at 4, 5.
198. Decision, Indiana (1980), supra note 188, no. 6 (C.R.A. Supplement).
199. Id. The 1979 and 1980 decisions are discussed in Mortimer, Current Developments in
C.R.A. Enforcement, 98 BANKING L.J. 604, 609-10 (1981).
200. See, e.g., Decision, Riggs, supra note 188, no. 7.
201. See, e.g., id. Conditions attached to approvals include discussion of C.R.A. issues by
the bank board of directors, regular reports to the board, and formation of top-level C.R.A.
committees.
202. Reference to one decision in 1984 was located in a secondary source. Protestors had
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were denied or conditionally approved in the early years to convey
to national banks the message that failure to maintain good C.R.A.
performance can have serious consequences. Thereafter, "encourage-
ment" provided through less drastic means received the banks' careful
attention, obviating the need for further denials. Another possibility
is that O.C.C. is no longer as committed to C.R.A. enforcement. In
the absence of current publicly available data, any conclusions would
be speculative.
C. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (F.D.I.C.) was the first
supervisory agency to deny a bank's application because of an
inadequate C.R.A. record-a decision said to have "sent shock waves
through the banking community. ' 20 3 The publicly disclosed record
of F.D.I.C. rulings on bank applications is extremely limited, 204 but
does include three denials of bank applications for branch offices. 20 1
In a fourth case, F.D.I.C. granted approval subject to certain con-
ditions.3 Although community group objections play an important
objected to a bank's plan to "focus marketing efforts on upwardly mobile individuals." The
Comptroller found that the plan did not necessarily derogate from the bank's commitment to
serve all segments of local communities. Applications of Dimension Fin. Corp. to Charter 31
Nat'l Banks in 25 States (Compt. Curr. May 9, 1984), cited and discussed in Lobell, supra
note 94, at 1087, 1087 n.71.
203. Mortimer, supra note 199, at 609. Two other commentators said that the decision
"set an aggressive tone for the agency." W. DENNIS & J. POTrINGER, supra note 5, at 10-40.
204. The F.D.I.C. has publicly released only seven formal rulings. Telephone conversation
with Roger Hood, Assistant General Counsel, F.D.I.C., Washington, D.C. (July 1, 1985). The
documents, in chronological order are as follows:
1. In re: The Greater New York Say. Bank, N.Y., Kings County, N.Y., Application for
Consent to Establish a Branch (Denial) (F.D.I.C. Apr. 23, 1979), reprinted in DIscRnBmNATION
IN MORTGAGE CREDIT: REGULATION, LITIGATION, AND COMPLIANCE 425 (W. Dennis & D.
Glascoff eds. Prac. L. Inst. 1979).
2. In re: Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Md., Riverdale, Prince Georges County, Md.,
Application for Consent to Establish a Branch (F.D.I.C. Feb. 9, 1981).
3. In re: Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Md., Riverdale, Prince Georges County, Md.,
Application for Consent to Merge & Establish Five Branches (F.D.I.C. Feb. 9, 1981), reprinted
in F.D.I.C. 1981 ANN. REP., vol. 2, 1981 Merger Dec. 9 (1982).
4. F.D.I.C. Order in re Dauphin (Denial), supra note 94.
5. In re: Provident Say. Bank, Jersey City, Hudson County, N.J., Application to Establish
a Branch (Denial) (F.D.I.C. Sept. 29, 1980).
6. F.D.I.C. Order in re Dauphin (reconsideration), supra note 120 (copies of 1-6 on file at
Pacific Law Journal).
The above documents will be hereinafter cited simply as "F.D.I.C. Order in re:" followed
by the most distinctive word in the bank's name, along with the item number.
205. F.D.I.C. Order in re: Greater New York, supra note 204, no. 1; F.D.I.C. Order in
re: Provident, supra note 204, no. 5; F.D.I.C. Order in re: Dauphin (Denial), supra note 94.
206. Citizens Bank & Trust submitted two separate applications, which were approved on
the same date and subject to the same conditions. The applicant was required to redelineate
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role, 207 at least one of the denials resulted from internal agency
procedures without the prompting of a community group. 203
F.D.I.C. "orders" (rulings on bank applications) provide excellent
examples of rigorous standards and effective "encouragement" of
banks to more adequately help meet the credit needs of all parts of
their communities. For example, Dauphin Bank in Harrisburg, Penn-
sylvania, had established a pattern and reputation of lending in
suburbs of Harrisburg, while ignoring the inner city.209 The bank
made minor changes after a community group filed objections to its
application, but was unable to demonstrate tangible improvement in
serving the credit needs of inner-city areas. The application was
denied. 210 Subsequently, Dauphin Bank directed widely-publicized
efforts to inner-city neighborhoods to encourage loan applications,
committed funds for real estate loans in lower-income neighborhoods,
agreed to participate in the city's rehabilitation programs, and reached
a written agreement with the community group that had originally
protested the application. Less than a year after the original appli-
cation, the bank won reconsideration and approval of its applica-
tion.2 11 Other decisions suggest that commitments and preliminary
efforts to improve C.R.A. performance are considered favorably, but
that significant demonstrated results are necessary for approval.2 12 In
support of this position, it may be noted that C.R.A. directs the
supervisory agencies to consider the bank's record, not its promises.
Lending policies of a bank that are facially neutral but discrimi-
natory in effect are unacceptable to the F.D.I.C. For example, the
its community so as not to exclude low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, identify those
neighborhoods and communicate with their residents, and establish a loan counseling program.
F.D.I.C. Order in re: Citizens (Branch), supra note 204, no. 2; F.D.I.C. Order in re: Citizens
(Merger), supra note 204, no. 3.
207. During 1979, 25 challenges were filed on C.R.A. grounds. F.D.I.C. 1979 ANN. REP.
20.
208. F.D.I.C. Order in re: Provident, supra note 204, no. 5.
209. F.D.I.C. Order in re: Dauphin (Denial), supra note 94.
210. Id.
211. F.D.I.C. Order in re: Dauphin (Reconsideration), supra note 120.
212. See, e.g., F.D.I.C. Order in re: Greater New York, supra note 204, no. 1. The bank
had begun a program of advertising, contacting real estate brokers, and meeting with community
groups, and it purchased municipal housing development corporation bonds. Its increase in
local lending activity in Brooklyn was significant, but the absolute level was still very low.
The F.D.I.C. Board of Directors found the banks progress to be "encouraging" but not
"sufficiently favorable," and denied the application. The Comptroller of the Currency, in his
capacity as one of the three F.D.I.C. Directors, dissented, arguing that the application should
have been approved with the understanding that additional progress would be expected in the
future. Id. at 2. One commentator found the majority decision (commending the progress but
finding it insufficient) to be "somewhat enigmatic." Healey, supra note 58, at 734.
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Provident Savings Bank in New Jersey restricted itself to loans on
recently-constructed one- and two-family residences213-a policy that is
not invidious on its face. The effect, however, was a disproportion-
ately high rate of rejection on loan applications from low- and middle-
income neighborhoods, because a large proportion of the housing
stock in those neighborhoods was older and multiple-family. Minority
group applicants also suffered a disproportionately high rate of
rejection. In addition, the bank's delineation of its community un-
reasonably excluded low- and middle-income neighborhoods, and the
bank failed to maintain racial and other data required by regulation.
Intentional discrimination by the bank was not conclusively estab-
lished, but the bank's application was nevertheless denied.2 14
F.D.I.C.'s most recent denial or conditional approval of a bank
application was in 1981, and the agency's C.R.A. enforcement pro-
gram since then is difficult to assess. The program may have been
impeded somewhat by financial difficulties of some of the banks
supervised by F.D.I.C. in recent years. 2" It is quite likely that banks
noted the agency's decisive treatment of bank applications involving
C.R.A. issues in the years shortly after the Act's enactment, and
adjusted their conduct accordingly. 2 6 However, insufficient data from
F.D.I.C. is available to adequately gauge its current C.R.A. enforce-
ment program.
D. Federal Reserve Board
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (F.R.B.)
has a public record on C.R.A. enforcement that is noticeably diver-
gent from the three other federal supervisory agencies. Although the
F.R.B. joined in the uniform C.R.A. regulations, its public statements
and formal rulings2 7 indicate an interpretation and application of
213. F.D.I.C. Order in re: Provident, supra note 204, no. 5.
214. Id. Another example of "effects test" analysis is in F.D.I.C. Order in re: Dauphin
(Denial), supra note 94.
215. In 1982, failures of banks with F.D.I.C. insurance totaled 42 (the highest number
since 1940), as compared to 10 per year in 1978 and 1980. F.D.I.C. 1981 ANN. REp.
216. A member of F.D.I.C.'s staff describes C.R.A. as a "living success," causing banks
and community groups to become more sophisticated regarding each other's concerns, to
negotiate, and to reach accommodations. She states that no C.R.A. protests have been received
by F.D.I.C. since 1982. Telephone conversation with Patricia A. McCormick, Office of
Consumer Programs, F.D.I.C., Washington, D.C. (July 2, 1985).
217. The Board of Governors has given formal considertion to at least 28 bank applications
protested on C.R.A. grounds, as follows (in chronological order):
1. Commerce Bancshares, 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 576 (1978), aff'd per curiam sub nom.
Manchester-Tower Grove Community Org./ACORN v. Board of Governors, 607 F.2d 494
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the rules that is markedly less stringent than the other agencies.
The F.R.B. resistance to C.R.A. appears based on ideological
grounds, despite the fact that Congress has already weighed the
competing policy considerations. The F.R.B. appears to remain un-
persuaded that redlining exists or, if it exists, that it is a problem
that should be addressed. 218 Although all four supervisory agencies
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
2. Citicorp, 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 507, 512 (1979).
3. Ohio Citizens Trust Co. (decided May 1, 1979, per Canner, The Community Rein-
vestment Act: A Second Progress Report, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 813, 819 (1981), but not otherwise
reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin).
4. Trust Co., 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 668 (1979).
5. Michigan Nat'l Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 247 (1980).
6. AmeriTrust Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 238 (1980).
7. Landmark Bancshares Corp. (decided Nov. 30, 1979, per Canner, The Community
Reinvestment Act: A Second Progress Report, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 813, 820 (1981), but not
otherwise reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin).
8. Mid-Continent Bancshares, Inc. (decided Nov. 9, 1979, per Canner, The Community
Reinvestment Act: A Second Progress Report, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 813, 820-21 (1981), but not
otherwise reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin).
9. First Nat'l Boston Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 162 (1980).
10. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 601 (1980).
11. Society Nat'l Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 351 (1980).
12. Farmers & Merchants State Bank of Sebawaing (decided Dec. 4, 1979, per Canner,
The Community Reinvestment Act: A Second Progress Report, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 813, 821-
22 (1981), but not otherwise reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin).
13. Chemical Bank, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 776 (1980).
14. F & M Bancshares, Inc., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 508 (1980).
15. National City Corp., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 52 (1981).
16. First Nat'l Boston Corp., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 253, 576 (1981).
17. Girard Co., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 916 (1981).
18. First Nat'l Bank of Allentown (decided Aug. 28, 1981, per Canner, The Community
Reinvestment Act: A Second Progress Report, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 813, 823 (1981), but not
otherwise reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin).
19. Midland Bank Ltd., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 729 (1981).
20. AmenTrust Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 65 (1982).
21. First Nat'l BanCorp. (application filed Aug. 27, 1981, listed as pending in Nov. 1981
in Canner, The Community Reinvestment Act: A Second Progress Report, 67 Fed. Res. Bull.
813, 823 (1981), but not otherwise reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin).
22. NBD Bancorp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 306 (1982).
23. National City Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 427 (1982).
24. Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 499 (1982).
25. Mellon Nat'l Corp., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 721 (1983).
26. Citicorp, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 149 (1984) (acquisition of a Chicago thrift institution).
27. Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374 (1984).
28. Citicorp, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 431 (1984) (acquisition of a Maryland bank).
The above orders will be hereinafter cited merely by the most distinctive word(s) of the
bank name, plus the year of decision where necessary for identification, along with the item
number.
218. The attitude was stated in the first order discussing C.R.A. issues: "Other agencies
of government may have primary enforcement responsibilities with respect to such matters as
discriminatory lending practices, and ... there are constraints upon the extent to which such
laws as the Bank Holding Company and Bank Merger Acts should appropriately be used to
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agree that C.R.A. was not intended to impose mandatory government
allocation of credit, the F.R.B. at times appears fixated on the issue,
continuously reiterating its resolve not to participate in or counte-
nance any form of credit allocation. 219 Even when a bank is willing,
after negotiations with protesting community groups, to commit to
improve credit availability in underserved areas, the F.R.B. is careful
to dissociate itself from any provisions that might be deemed credit
allocation. 22° In general, the Federal Reserve System has developed a
reputation as, at best, disinterested in antidiscrimination and other
social policy programs. 221
achieve favored social objectives." Commerce Bancshares, supra note 217, no. 1, at 893. See
also several reports in Federal Reserve publications. Bowsher, supra note 23, at 3, 6. ("The
success of community groups in convincing the press and public that lenders were not serving
older urban areas was primarily the result of skillful publicity rather than substantial confirming
evidence."); Canner, Redlining: Research and Federal Legislative Response, 68 Fed. Res. Bull.
610 (1982) (reporting empirical studies of "alleged redlining activities," and conceding "wide
disparities" in lending in different neighborhoods, but stating that there is "little evidence to
indicate that any neighborhood has been simultaneously redlined by all bankers"); T. BUYNAIC,
supra note 58.
219. Orders deciding protested applications consistently reiterate the position that credit
allocation, including commitment by a bank of specified amounts or proportions of funds for
a particular purpose, are not within C.R.A.'s mandate. See, e.g., Commerce Bancshares, supra
note 217, no. 1; AmeriTrust (1980), supra note 217, no. 6; Michigan Natl Corp., supra note
217, no. 5; Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., supra note 217, no. 10; Landmark Bancshares,
supra note 217, no. 7; First Natl Boston, supra note 217, no. 9; NBD Bancorp, supra note
217, no. 22, at 308 n.4. See also Fed. Res. Sys., Community Reinvestment Act Information
Statement, 45 Fed. Reg. 1940 (1980), reprinted in 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 30 (1980); Hearings on
S. 406, supra note 2, at 14-15 (letter from Arthur Bums, Chairman of the Board of Governors)
(Mar. 21, 1977); Canner, Redlining: Research and Federal Legislative Response, 68 Fed. Res.
Bull. 610 (1982); Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, News Release (Nov. 30, 1979), cited in Canner,
The Community Reinvestment Act: A Second Progress Report, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 813, 820
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Canner, Second]; Fed. Res. Bank of Philadelphia, News Release
(Aug. 28, 1981), cited in Canner, Second, supra at 823. The F.R.B.'s staff demonstrates a
similar hostility to the concept of credit allocation. See, e.g., T. BuYx, supra note 58; 0.
CANNER, CREDrr ALLOCATION, supra note 119. See also Garwood, supra note 66, at 1308
("The outcry against these rules is over real substance-the statute's perceived flirtation with
the concept of credit allocation").
220. See, e.g., Landmark Bancshares, supra note 217, no. 7. Under the terms of a negotiated
settlement, the protestant community group withdrew its protest, and the bank agreed to a
specific dollar target for residential mortgage loans in the group's community. The F.R.B.
approved the bank's application but issued a press release stating that "the Reserve Bank does
not endorse any term of the agreement" that may result in credit allocation. G. CANNER,
CREDrr ALLOCATION, supra note 119, at 5 (citing Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, News Release
(Nov. 30, 1979)). A general statement of the Board's policy is in G. CANNER, REDLI-NN:
RasEARcH AND FEDERAL LEGISLATI RESPONSE 610, 611 (1982).
221. See, e.g., Searing, supra note 39, at 1127-43 (of the four agencies, F.R.B. is the most
dilatory and reluctant to enforce antidiscrimination laws); Note, Legislating Against Mortgage
Redlining: The Need for a Firmer Commitment, 12 RuToERs L.J. 151, 179 (1980). The F.R.B.
has identified very few instances of violations of the 1968 Fair Housing Act or the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, either because discrimination does not exist or because no one has
been looking for it. W. DE-ris, TBE DETECTION AND CORREMCON OF CRDrr DiscInNATIoN:
A REPORT TO THE BoARD OF GovwR.oas OF THE FEDERAL REsEnvE SYsTEm 141-42 (1978). In
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When C.R.A. was enacted, commentators expected that enforce-
ment by the F.R.B. would be characterized by "leniency." 222 Resist-
ance to change became apparent in the Board of Governor's first
reference to C.R.A. in an order approving a bank application. 223 The
F.R.B. announced that C.R.A. had not changed previous law or the
Board's policies, because credit needs had always been included within
the traditional "convenience and needs" standard applied to appli-
cations for bank branches and mergers? 4 The F.R.B. then granted
unconditional approval of a protested merger application filed by a
St. Louis bank.?5 The circumstances of the decision were so ques-
tionable that it evoked immediate protests from the primary sponsors
of C.R.A. in both the House and Senate.22 The chief Senate sponsor
of the legislation wrote that the F.R.B. had "totally misinterpreted
the affirmative obligations principle" of C.R.A., construing it instead
as "requiring nothing more than the absence of overt discrimina-
tion."227
The F.R.B.'s consumer compliance examiners find few C.R.A.-
related problems that they consider serious. The Federal Reserve
comparison, the F.H.L.B.B. found no violations for eight years, and 2,800 violations in the
year following institution of a revised training program. Id. In enforcing Equal Credit
Opportunity provisions, the F.R.B. has been shown to be far more solicitous of the interests
of financial institutions than the statutory rights of consumers. Comment, The Federal Reserve
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act: A Marriage of Inconvenience, 2 AN. BANKINo L.
Rv. 301, 307-09 (1983).
222. Healey, supra note 58, at 729. The conclusion was based on a statement by the
F.R.B.'s general counsel and also on "the traditional economic focus of the 'convenience and
needs' test for deciding applications, and the F.R.B.'s policy of imposing the burden of proof
on parties protesting a bank's application." Id. at 728-29.
223. Commerce Bancshares, supra note 217, no. 1.
224. Id. At the time of the order, C.R.A. had been enacted but was not yet effective. The
Board stated that its decision would have been the same even if C.R.A. had been in effect.
Id. at 579. Because the facts in the case were such that the Board could easily have justified
its approval of the application on a finding that C.R.A. was not in fact violated, its deliberate
effort to dismiss C.R.A. as merely repeating prior law has been construed as "sending a
message to the industry, and perhaps to Congress, that the CRA would have no special impact
on its evaluation philosophy." McCluskey, supra note 31, at 47 (1983). See also Michigan
Nat'l Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 247, 248-49 (1980).
225. Commerce Bancshares, supra note 217, no. 1.
226. Letter from Senator Proxmire, to Federal Reserve Board Chairman G. William Miller
(Aug. 14, 1978), cited in R. BRANDE. & M. LARGE, supra note 29, at 26-27; Letter from
Representative St. Germain, to Federal Reserve Board Chairman G. William Miller (Aug. 15,
1978), cited in R. BRANDEL & M. LARGE, supra note 29, at 27.
227. Senator Proxmire's letter stated that C.R.A. called for "aggressive and affirmative
lending efforts to provide housing and small business loans in the local community, with
particular emphasis on low and moderate income neighborhoods," but that the F.R.B.
construed it as "requiring nothing more than the absence of overt discrimination." Letter
from Senator Proxmire, to Federal Reserve Board Chairman G. William Miller (Aug. 14,
1978), cited in R. BRANDEL & M. LARGE, supra note 29, at 27.
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System uses the same numerical scale as the other four supervisory
agencies for rating C.R.A. performance by individual depository
institutions, with one being the best performance and five being the
worst. As applied by the Federal Reserve, however, virtually no bank
receives a five and only six percent receive a four or three. 22 The
examiners' ability to identify C.R.A. violations is impaired by the
fact the Federal Reserve System is alone among the four supervisory
agencies in failing to develop a computer-assisted monitoring sys-
tem.229 The Federal Reserve System is also alone in failing to require
registers of loan applications. 230
Thousands of bank applications for branches or mergers have been
considered,231 including more than twenty-five that were protested on
C.R.A. grounds that were deemed "substantive" by the F.R.B. 232
The total number of applications denied because of unsatisfactory
C.R.A. records is zero. The total number of applications approved
subject to a "condition" is one. The Board of Governors does not
believe that poor C.R.A. performance should inhibit a bank's ability
to expand. In the rare instances in which the Board of Governors
does recognize a problem (occasionally even without the prompting
of a community group protest),231 the most stringent sanction is
228. In 1982, no bank had a C.R.A. rating of five, and approximately six percent had
ratings of three or four. Discussion, supra note 158, at 10 (statement of Mr. Baebel, Senior
Review Examiner, F.R.B. Division of Consumer and Community Affairs). The official report
for 1982 supplies additional detail, the usefulness of which is impaired by the fact that the
percentages add up to 105%. "About 79 percent of the state member banks received a rating
of 2; 12 percent, a rating of 1; 13 percent a rating of 3; and less than 1 percent, a rating of
4. No bank received a 5." BD. Gov. FED. REs. Sys., 69m ANN. REP. 159 (1983). In 1984,
the Federal Reserve Board rejected a recommendation of its Consumer Advisory Council to
revise its C.R.A. rating system. Announcement: Enforcement of Community Reinvestment
Act, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 108 n.2 (1984).
229. SECTION 340(e) REPORT, supra note 148. The Federal Reserve Board in 1984 responded
to a proposal of its Consumer Advisory Council to adopt an automated or computerized
system for analyzing racial and other data on loan applicants by stating that the issue was
"[l]eft open for future consideration." Announcement: Enforcement of Community Reinvest-
ment Act, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 108 (1984).
230. See supra note 148; infra text accompanying notes 249-51. The F.R.B. recently
responded to a recommendation of its Consumer Advisory Council for development of a
system for gathering information on race, national origin, sex, marital status, and age of loan
applicants, by calling for further study. Announcement: Enforcement of Community Rein-
vestment Act, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 108 (1984).
231. In 1982, for example, the Federal Reserve handled 1,596 bank applications covered
by C.R.A. CON. ADV. CouN., THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S IMPLEMENTATION OF C.R.A., supra
note 63.
232. G. CuaNER, CREDIT ALLOCATION, supra note 119, at 3 n.13. This study found 20
protested applications. Canner's study, prepared in 1982, should be updated by the four
additional decisions in 1983 and 1984, listed as items 25 to 28 in supra note 217.
233. At least 26 nonprotested applications were reviewed from banks with a C.R.A. rating
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recitation of "commitments" that the bank chooses to make (rather
than "conditions" that are imposed by the F.R.B.) in the order
approving the application.23 4  Ten orders have referred to
commitments 235 which usually relate to bank efforts to improve
marketing and communication with the underserved areas of the
community, and to training bank personnel to be aware of C.R.A.
responsibilities.236
A few banks committed themselves to substantial changes in lend-
ing policies. 2 7 For example, one bank located in an urban area in
which most residences were three- and four-family dwellings agreed to
discontinue its policy against granting mortgage loans on that type
of structure, and agreed to participate in housing rehabilitation
projects. 23 When any bank policy might be interpreted as an allo-
cation of credit created by circumstances other than market forces,
however, the Board of Governors carefully designates that the policy
is not a commitment to the Board. 9
that was less than satisfactory. All were approved, but with commitments or substantive
changes to improve C.R.A. performance. Canner, Second, supra note 219, at 816. However,
the details of these cases are not publicly disclosed.
234. As explained by a staff member of the F.R.B., "[t]he distinction between commitments
and conditions hinges primarily on the fact that without a condition, an application otherwise
would be denied." T. BuYNAK, supra note 58, at 4 n.2. The distinction is illustrated by a
decision in which the F.R.B. accepted a "commitment" regarding C.R.A. factors and simul-
taneously imposed a "condition" regarding business practices in competition with other
financial institutions. Citicorp (1984) (acquisition of Illinois thrift institution), supra note 217,
no. 28. Reliance on "commitments" has been adopted as a general matter of policy. Infor-
mation Statement re Community Reinvestment Act, 45 Fed. Reg. 1940 (1980), reprinted in 66
Fed. Res. Bull. 30, 31 (1980). "Commitments for future action" may outweigh "adverse
aspects in a C.R.A. record." Id. Notably, when the other supervisory agencies issued a joint
"Information Statement" plainly modeled on the F.R.B.'s earlier statement, the reference to
promises outweighing actual performance was deleted. F.F.I.E.C., C.R.A. Information State-
ment, supra note 36; McCluskey, supra note 31, at 45.
235. Statement of Governor Teeters, in Discussion, supra note 158, at 1. Summaries of
the first 21 cases are in Canner, Second, supra note 219, at 819-23.
236. For examples of Commitments, see National City Corp. (1981), supra note 217, no.
26; AmeriTrust, supra note 217, no. 6; Michigan Nat'l Corp., supra note 217, no. 5; Ohio
Citizens Trust Co., supra note 217, no. 3; Mid-Continent Bancshares, Inc., supra note 217,
no. 8; Society Corp., supra note 217, no. 11; Bank of New England, supra note 217, no.
27. The banks committed themselves to increased advertising, attendance at meetings of com-
munity groups, contacts with local realtors, and designation of a bank officer to meet with
the groups. One bank, upon acquiring a thrift institution, committed itself to maintain at least
the same percentage of assets invested in local residential mortgages as the thrift had previously,
ad to "develop community programs." Citicorp (1984) (acquisition of Illinois thrift institu-
tion), supra note 217, no. 26.
237. See, e.g., Landmark Bancshares Corp., supra note 217, no. 7 (bank agreed to offer
certain types of F.H.A. loans at a one-half percent discount, and to reserve $1 million for
real estate loans in 1980).
238. Society Nat'l Corp., supra note 217, no. 11.
239. G. CANNa, CaaDrr ALLocATIoN, supra note 119, at 5. As Governor Teeters has
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An examination of the particular facts underlying decisions to
approve bank applications provides some insight into the Board of
Governors' attitudes and standards. In a number of instances, the
decision reached appears plainly incongruent with the seriousness of
the violations and problems recited in the Board of Governors'
orders. Worthy of particular attention are the decisions on applica-
tions filed by two banks: AmeriTrust Corporation of Cleveland,2 °
and Michigan National Corporation of Bloomfield Fields, Michi-
gan.241
In the 1980 AmeriTrust case, data prepared by the bank indicated
that mortgage lending volume was eighteen times greater in high-
income neighborhoods than in low- and moderate-income neighbor-
hoods. Lower demand for credit in the less-wealthy areas accounted
for much of the disparity, but far from all of it. According to the
Board of Governors, even after adjusting for differences in credit
demand, AmeriTrust was 1.6 times as active in providing mortgage
loans in higher-income areas as compared to less-wealthy areas, and
twice as active in suburbs as compared to the city. Perhaps most
disturbing was the F.R.B.'s determination that AmeriTrust was twice
as active in largely white areas as compared to largely black areas
having similar income characteristics. 2
Moreover, the bank engaged in practices masking the extent of
discrimination in lending. According to the Board of Governors,
AmeriTrust prescreened and discouraged loan applications in branch
offices located in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, in clear
violation of federal rules, and failed to record other information
necessary to monitor discrimination. The Board asserted that it
viewed these violations as "extremely serious."243
AmeriTrust's attempts to determine the credit needs of lower-
income areas in its community were ineffective, according to the
stated, the Board of Governors has "resisted strongly any settlement of a C.R.A. protest that
contains a commitment as part of the approval of a bank holding company application that
requires the applicant to provide funds for a specific purpose. We feel that is an inappropriate
use of regulatory powers." An example of a formal dissociation of the F.R.B. from an
agreement between a community group and a bank, that might be construed as an allocation
of credit, is in Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, News Release (Nov. 30, 1979), cited in Canner,
Second, supra note 219, at 820. In contrast, the F.H.L.B.B. has no hesitation in specifying
necessary changes in loan policy by a savings and loan association. See supra notes 179-85
and accompanying text.
240. AmeriTrust (1980), supra note 207, no. 6; AmeriTrust (1982), supra note 217, no.
20.
241. Michigan Nat'l Corp., supra note 217, no. 5.
242. AmeriTrust (1980), supra note 217, no. 6, at 240.
243. Id. at 241.
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Board of Governors, and the bank's advertising in black-oriented
media focused on attracting deposits, not offering credit. 2 4 Relations
with community groups were so abysmal that AmeriTrust refused to
respond directly to their allegations, and the F.R.B.'s staff was unable
to arrange a meeting format to which both sides would agree. 245
In summary, the Board of Governors determined that AmeriTrust
followed an lending policy having discriminatory effects, violated
antidiscrimination regulations, and directed minimal efforts towards
determining the credit needs of its entire community. Balanced against
these extremely negative findings are certain, though rather limited,
favorable aspects. The bank offered federally insured loans to small
businesses, and participated in three federally insured housing projects
(but had since discontinued making F.H.A. and V.A. loans). In
home improvement lending, AmeriTrust was "somewhat more ac-
tive" in black as compared to white areas (but nevertheless had only
nineteen percent of its loans in low- and moderate-income areas);
AmeriTrust supported some community groups (but two-thirds were
outside of the city); and the bank held some government bonds (but
none related to housing).2"
Considering the relative weight of the negative and the positive
aspects of the record, the determination by the Board of Governors
is startling: "AmeriTrust has taken few steps aimed specifically to
help meet the credit needs of low and moderate income areas, but
while its record leaves room for improvement it would, absent other
conditions, be consistent with approval of these applications." 247 As
if in aniticipation of litigation, the F.R.B. noted that it was permitted
wide discretion, and that AmeriTrust had made certain "commit-
ments," mainly to improve staff training. The F.R.B. also stated
that it had considered the benefits of allowing "expansion of well
managed financial institutions.' '24
The Board of Governors did, however, impose a "condition" -to
date the F.R.B.'s most draconian publicly disclosed sanction against
244. Id. at 240-41.
245. Id. at 239.
246. Id. at 240-41.
247. Id. at 241.
248. Id. at 241 n.6. The commitments were to (1) improve staff training, (2) offer either
credit counselling or referrals to other organizations, (3) make public its real estate appraisal
standards, (4) "study the feasibility of making public its lending policies," and (5) make public
the commitments numbered (2), (3), and (4). In the litigation that followed, the F.R.B.'s
decision was affirmed per curiam. Manchester-Tower Grove Community Org./ACORN v.
Board of Governors, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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a member bank based on C.R.A. AmeriTrust was required to main-
tain, for at least one year, a register of all inquiries and applications
for real estate loans made in person 49 Even this minimal requirement
was considered too harsh by two of the Governors, who argued for
approval without this "unwarranted burden." 0 In comparison, the
F.D.I.C. and F.H.L.B.B. require loan inquiry registers as a matter
of routine, even without a specific finding of "very serious" Equal
Credit Opportunity violations.251
The community group that had led the challenge to AmeriTrust's
application concluded that C.R.A. does not work, and that the Board
of Governors was concerned that enforcement would induce banks
to leave the Federal Reserve System. Their only solace was that
approval of the application had been delayed by at least a year, at
great cost to the bank and minimal cost to the group.252 Two years
later, in 1982, community groups filed a challenge to another
AmeriTrust application, charging that the bank had failed to adhere
to its commitments and conditions. That application was also ap-
proved, with yet another "commitment.' '253
A comparable decision was issued in the case of Michigan National
Corp., which sought approval for acquisition of four banks.25 4 The
order of the Board of Governors reported a series of extremely
serious negative findings, a few minor countervailing factors, and
the decision that the overall record justified approval of the appli-
cation.
The order noted persistent violations of the basic procedural re-
quirements of both H.M.D.A. and C.R.A., and intoned that the
"Board views this noncompliance as a serious matter. ' 255 The bank
granted only 7 mortgage loans per 100,000 units of housing located
in low- and moderate-income areas, as compared to 101 such loans
per 100,000 units in the remainder of the metropolitan area. More
housing loans were made in white neighborhoods than in racially
mixed neighborhoods with similar income levels. The bank failed to
249. Ameritrust (1980), supra note 217, no. 6, at 242.
250. Id. (concurring statement of Governors Wallich and Caldwell).
251. 12 C.F.R. §§ 338.4 (1986) (F.D.I.C.), 528.6 (1986) (F.H.L.B.B.).
252. V. BENEDEK, supra note 37, at 36-38.
253. AmeriTrust (1982), supra note 217, no. 20. For a view that AmeriTrust several years
later has reformed, see infra note 268.
254. Michigan Nat'I Corp., supra note 217, no. 5.
255. Id. at 248. The protesting community group experienced "considerable difficulty"
obtaining the basic C.R.A. and H.M.D.A. data that by regulation should be freely available,
according to the Board's order, and notices were not posted as required. Id.
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systematically determine its community's credit needs, failed to mar-
ket its credit services in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, and
oriented its advertising in those neighborhoods to deposits rather
than loans. The only favorable factors were that the bank participated
in some S.B.A., F.H.A., and Neighborhood Housing Services pro-
grams, and owned some securities issued by a state housing devel-
opment authority. The Board of Governors approved the application,
while extracting only "commitments" by the bank.25 6
Considering not only these two examples but all of the orders
published to date, certain patterns become apparent. The orders
mention C.R.A. issues only when a community group protests an
application (with one possible exception). 2 7 A heavy burden of proof
is imposed on protestants, who are taken seriously only if they provide
extensive and sophisticated documentation.7ss Requests of protestants
for a formal public hearing are consistently denied, with a remark
in each case that no statute compels the agency to grant such
hearings.219 Violations of C.R.A. and H.M.D.A. procedural require-
256. Id. at 248-49. The Bank agreed to designate bank personnel to meet with the public,
to train its staff, to participate in additional (unspecified) special lending programs, and to
increase credit marketing efforts in lowand moderate-income areas.
257. Hutsonville Bank Corp., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 48 (1981). The order did not mention
any protestant but did note that "all comments received" had been considered. The applicant,
which as the only depository institution in town, had discontinued making residential mortgage
loans, and had a growing but very low ratio of loans to deposits. The application was
approved.
258. Commentators have identified "a policy on the part of the Federal Reserve Board,
not fully shared by the other bank agencies, of expecting community groups to undertake the
bulk of analysis and carry the burden of proof." W. DEartIs & J. PorrnoER, supra note 5,
at 10-22. This perception is amply supported by many of the Board's orders on protested
applications. The actual conduct of the Board is in contrast with its public statements to
Congress, which concede that C.R.A. shifted responsibility for determining whether banks are
meeting community credit needs from the public to the regulatory agencies. Statement by
Nancy H. Teeters, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate (Feb. 19, 1980),
66 Fed. Res. Bull. 217 (1980); Statement by Gov. Rice to House Committee, 66 Fed. Res.
Bull. 379 (1980).
259. See, e.g., First Nat'l Boston, supra note 217, no. 9, at 162 ("there are no material
factual differences that would necessitate a hearing"); National City (1981), supra note 217,
no. 15 (stating that the parties had ample opportunity for written submissions and that Federal
Reserve staff had attended a meeting organized by Protestant); National City (1982), supra
note 217, no. 15, at 428 (stating that no material facts were in dispute); Chemical Bank, supra
note 217, no. 13 (no facts in dispute); AmeriTrust, supra note 217, no. 20, at 239; Michigan
Nat'l Corp., supra note 217, no. 5, at 249 n.10 (a hearing "would serve no useful purpose");
Society Corp., supra note 217, no. 11, at 352 (hearing would serve no purpose). While denying
requests for "hearings," however, the F.R.B. will occasionally arrange "public meetings,"
which are "intended to shorten the processing time" needed by the Board to rule on the
application. Statement of Governor Teeters in Discussion, supra note 158, at 2. A total of
three such "public meetings" have been held. CoNs. AnV. Cotn., FanErD. REsERV'S ItILE-
MENTAnTON OF C.R.A., supra note 63, at 6.6. Private meetings are encouraged, because they
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ments are tolerated if the applicant either discontinues the violations
or promises to do so.2 °
The Board of Governors has conceded, both as a general matter
and in specific instances, that levels of credit are disproportionately
low in lower-income neighborhoods, and that legitimate economic
factors do not provide a full justification. 61 Yet when statistical
evidence documents such a "disparity," the Board of Governors has
been alert to any possibility, however remote or hypothetical, that a
variety of market forces might be responsible. The F.R.B. readily
accepts partial and unverified explanations, and states that evidence
of actual discriminatory intent is not available.2 62 When exhaustive
allow more realistic opportunities for negotiation and compromise. Whether a public forum
should be provided when private meetings fail is a matter of considerable controversy. One
view is that community awareness and confidence in the system would be enhanced, and that
polarization of the parties has already occurred. The contending position is that public
confrontations are unfairly harmful to banks and impede resolution of differences, and that
the availability of a public meeting could be used by community groups as a bargaining chip
to extract concessions. Id. at 6.6, A.13.
260. See, e.g., Michigan Nat'l Corp., supra note 217, no. 5; Society Corp., supra note
217, no. 11; First Nat'l Boston (1981), supra note 217, no. 19. One commentator has concluded
that
the Federal Reserve Board will look with favor on all indications that an institution
intends to change a previously poor C.R.A. record, and, where such performance
does improve, a poor previous record will not be held against an institution ....
An applicant may "negotiate" with the Federal Reserve Board, moreover, if its
CRA record to date is poor.
W. DENmis & J. POTTIoER supra note 5, at 10-20.
261. The Board states: "This is a serious matter." Information Statement Re Community
Reinvestment Act, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 30, 31 (1980); F.F.I.E.C., C.R.A. Information Statement,
supra note 36, at 4.
262. In the Society Corp. Order, supra note 217, no. 11, at 353, the Board conceded the
existence of a "significant disparity between the proportion of mortgage loan demand accom-
modated by [the bank] in suburban areas of Cuyahoga County and the demand accommodated
in Cleveland." The Board, however, was content to speculate that this "disparity may be the
result of a variety of other factors, such as the institutional structure of the market." No
further explanation and no indication of Board investigation of the matter was included in
the order.
Michigan National Bank granted 124 times as many loans in high-income areas as low- and
moderate-income areas. The Board hypothesized that this pattern "may be partially the result
of" a lower percentage of owner-occupied units in the lower-income areas. Michigan Nat'l
Corp., supra note 217, no. 5, at 249. In the National City case, "the disparity between the
amount of funds committed by Applicant to housing-related credit in low- and moderate-income
areas versus all other areas may be partially the result of factors that affect demand for such
credit." National City (1981), supra note 217, no. 15, at 56. Ohio Citizens Trust granted
comparatively few housing loans in certain areas, but the Board again accepted a partial
explanation (based on low average household income and urban renewal in the areas). Ohio
Citizens, supra note 217, no. 3. Citibank of New York closed proportionately more branch
offices (and opened fewer new ones) in minority and low-income areas than in other areas,
and the proportion of its mortgage lending in the disfavored areas declined. The F.R.B.,
however, chose to rely on the premise that mortgage lending was still possible in an area
having no branch office. Citicorp (1984) (acquisition of New York bank), supra note 217,
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documentation prepared by community groups demonstrates that a
bank's lending patterns are racially discriminatory in effect, the
F.R.B. has stated that no evidence of actual discrimination against
individuals or of illegal credit practices was presented. 263 Even when
such evidence is presented, the applications are approved. 26
no. 2. See also First Nat'l Boston Corp., supra note 217, no. 9 (bank had no residential
mortgage loans in lowand moderate-income areas, but was changing its policies). According
to one analyst, "the Board has hewn to a consistent line in downgrading credit-needs anaysis."
McCluskey, supra note 31, at 48.
263. A recent order suggests that statistical analysis, no matter how extensive or sophisti-
cated, will never be adequate to persuade the Board of Governors that discrimination exists.
A community group protesting an application of National City Corporation of Cleveland,
Ohio, applied multi-variate regression analysis to evaluate H.M.D.A. data, deed title transfer
information, and census data. The study's results, which were not disputed by the bank,
demonstrated that the bank extended less conventional mortgage credit in nonwhite neighbor-
hoods than in white neighborhoods. Moreover, when the bank did lend in integrated and
predominantly nonwhite areas, the borrowers were primarily white home-buyers. National
City, supra note 217, no. 15, at 428-29. The Board of Governors' response was that multiple
regression analysis does "not conclusively establish the significance of any particular variable,"
and that "apparently" the bank "receives relatively few mortgage loan applications from
lower-income neighborhoods and neighborhoods with a predominantly minority population."
Id. at 429, 429 n.7.
In another case, the bank's mortgage credit activity was shown to be nearly six times greater
in predominantly white neighborhoods than in predominantly black neighborhoods. Further-
more, lending declined in direct proportion to increases in nonwhite population in a particular
neighborhood. The Board of Governors response was that "Protestants have not provided
affidavits from individuals who claim to have been discriminated against." National City
(1981), supra note 217, no. 15, at 55. See also Michigan Nat'l Corp., supra note 217, no. 5;
Society Nat'l Corp., supra note 217, no. 11; NBD Bancorp, supra note 217, no. 22.
A study prepared for the F.R.B. found that "there are no cases involving credit discrimination
against minorities in the entire Federal Reserve System." CON. ADV. CouN., FEDERAL RESERvE'S
MPLEmENTATioN OF C.R.A., supra note 63, at 4.8. To some of the members of the investigating
panel, the F.R.B.'s bank examiners appeared "somewhat apathetic about the fair lending
exam." Id. at 4.9.
264. See, e.g., Canner, Research and Federal Legislative Response, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 610
(1983) (conceding the existence of "wide disparities" in conventional lending in different
neighborhoods, but intimating that the problem is not serious because there is "little evidence
to indicate that any neighborhood has been simultaneously redlined by all lenders" (emphasis
added)). See also the F.R.B.'s decisions in AmeriTrust, supra note 217, no. 6; Michigan
Nat'l Corp., supra note 217, no. 5. In the AmeriTrust case, protestants provided data showing
that the bank was twice as active in largely white as in largely black areas with similar income
characteristics, and specific evidence that three creditworthy individuals from black neighbor-
hoods were denied credit. The Board of Governors found violations of Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity regulations, but no "pattern of discrimination." Ameritrust (1980), supra note 217, no.
6, at 241-42.
Two commentators have concluded that the "Federal Reserve Board's official attitude is
that, generally speaking, there is no point in denying applications because of 'holes' in an
institution's C.R.A. record. According to the Board's general counsel, the purpose of C.R.A.
is to encourage improved lending records-not to hamper expansion." W. DENNIS & J.
PoTrTNER, supra note 5, at 10-20. Another study found that bank examiners in certain Federal
Reserve Banks "expressed skepticism over whether supervisory action, rather than moral
suasion, would be used even if they were able to find substantive violations by state member
banks." CON. ADv. CouN., FEDERA RESERVE'S IMPLEMENTATION OF C.R.A., supra note 63,
at 4.8.
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The formal rulings by the Board of Governors are, of course, onlyone element of the Federal Reserve System's C.R.A. enforcementprocess, and not sufficient in themselves to justify a reliable gener-alization.265 Still, the rulings collectively send a message to banks thatare members of the System.66 Not once has the performance of anapplicant bank been found unsatisfactory. That fact, coupled withthe public pronouncements of the F.R.B., other aspects of theF.R.B.'s enforcement program, and its overall reputation in civilrights and social issue regulation, must surely detract from the
effectiveness of the F.R.B.'s compliance efforts.
Some positive results have been achieved, 267 and there are someindications of improvements in attitudes and policies.26 Hardly any
265. One means of attaining compliance without producing a record of applications deniedwould be to informally counsel banks with unsatisfactory C.R.A. performance to withdrawtheir applications until the banks' performance improve sufficiently-a policy that the F.H.L.B.B.has used with some effectiveness. The Federal Reserve System apparently follows a similarpolicy occasionally. See BD. Gov. Rs. Sys., 69TH ANN. REP. 159 (1983) (reporting that in1982 one bank withdrew an application, to provide time for improvements in C.R.A. perform-ance); W. DErmis & J. POTTiNGER, supra note 5, at 10-18. The critical difference between theF.H.L.B.B. and the F.R.B. in this regard, however, is that the F.H.L.B.B. has not establisheda record of granting formal unconditional approval to banks having extremely negative C.R.A.
records.266. As a Federal Reserve staff member wrote, the orders "were intended to communicatepublic policy stances with respect to CRA implementation." G. CANNER, CREDrr ALLOCATION,
supra note 119, at 3.267. In 1982, for example, one bank application was withdrawn to allow the bank time toimprove its C.R.A. performance, and another was approved following an negotiated settlementbetween the bank and a protestant. BD. Gov. FED. REs. Sys., 69TH ANN. REP. 159 (1983).More than a dozen banks have made commitments to the F.R.B. in response to protestinitiated by community groups. Canner, Second, supra note 219.Although The Consumer Advisory Council of the Federal Reserve Board listed over 50criticisms and suggestions for improvement of C.R.A. enforcement, it also found favorableaspects. According to the report, the F.R.B. staff's community outreach, its training ofconsumer compliance examiners, and its use of outside contacts in the examination processare "far greater and more extensive than that of both the Comptroller of the Currency andthe Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation." CON. ADv. CouN., FEDERAL RESERVE'S IMPLE-MENTATION OF C.R.A., supra note 63, at 3.2. The Federal Reserve Board adopted many ofthe Council's recommendations, including improved public notice of bank applications, clari-fication of the functions of Community Affairs Officers in the regional Reserve Banks,increased emphasis on contacts with minority and community groups, and development ofadditional materials for use by compliance examiners. The F.R.B. decided against promptaction implementing systems for gathering or analyzing racial and other information on loanapplicants, or routine use of "testers" for illegal credit discrimination. Announcement: En-forcement of Community Reinvestment Act, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 108 (1984).268. According to the F.R.B.'s Community Affairs Coordinator, C.R.A. implementationhas been extremely successful, achieving slow but steady progress in changing attitudes andbehavior of the Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve staff, and the regulated banks.Telephone conversation with James W. Lowell, Community Affairs Coordinator, Division ofConsumer and Community Affairs, F.R.B., Washington, D.C. (July 3, 1985). Many billionsof dollars have been invested in communities that would not have been invested before C.R.A.,which caused banks to learn that local investment is good business. The reason that such
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evidence of substantial reform, however, has yet become apparent in
the F.R.B.'s publicly disclosed record.
269 At present, the Federal
Reserve System appears to be the least committed and the least
effective of the four supervisory agencies in C.R.A. enforcement.
270
VI. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE: THE EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION
A superficial consideration of the current movement toward 
der-
egulation of the banking industry
271 might suggest that programs such
as the C.R.A. are due for decline or repeal.
272 What is far more
progress is not apparent in the public record, he stated, 
is that agreements are reached in
private meetings of banks and community groups, and banks 
withdraw applications fairly
often to avoid the publicity of denial. The F.R.B. monitors 
"commitments" carefully, and is
prepared to deny an application if necessary. He stated 
also that AmeriTrust (discussed in
supra text accompanying notes 240-53) maintained the required register 
of loan applications
for three years, changed its management and policies, and 
is now a model of C.R.A.
performance. Id.
269. Even the Consumer Advisory Council of the Federal 
Reserve Board, performing a
study on implementation of C.R.A. at the Board's request, 
was denied information vital to
evaluation of the F.R.B.'s staff's operating practices. According 
to the Council, "[e]xaminers'
work papers were not made available . . . " "records 
of application protest proceedings
excluded confidential trade information, staff recommendations 
and examination report infor-
mation," and "a significant portion of staff analyses and 
recommendations were deleted
... ." CoN. ADv. CouN., FEDERAL REsERVE's IMPLEMENTATION OF 
C.R.A., supra note 63, at
2.1. Under such circumstances, it seems not unreasonable to 
evaluate the F.R.B. on the basis
of the information it releases to the public, and to maintain 
a noncommittal attitude toward
indications of reform that is not yet reflected in the public record.
270. See, e.g., McCluskey, supra note 31, at 46 (referring to the "disengagement 
of the
FRB from her sister agencies over the use of CRA ... 
as a regulatory tool" and the
"dichotomy" between the FRB and the other agencies).
271. Depository institutions have been allowed to expand into 
new lines of business, such
as stock brokerage and equity participation in real estate ventures. 
See, e.g., Statement by J.
Charles Partee, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, 
and Finance of the Committee
on Energy and Commerce, United States House of Representatives 
(Apr. 2, 1985), 71 Fed.
Res. Bull. 409, 411 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Statement of J. Charles Partee, 
Governor,
F.R.B. (1985)]. At the same time, they have been subjected to unaccustomed 
competition in
their traditional functions from, for example, "non-bank banks," 
companies that either accept
deposits or offer loans, but not both, and thus escape the jurisdiction of the federal 
supervisory
agencies. Id. at 410; Statement by Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, 
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, before the Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions Supervision, Reg-
ulation and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance 
and Urban Affairs, United
States House of Representatives (Apr. 17, 1985), reprinted in 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 
424 (1985)
(referring to "evasion of some of the basic tenets of public policy ... " by "non-bank 
banks"
and noting also the potential for evasion by "non-thrift thrifts").
272. The F.R.B.'s Consumer Advisory Council reported in 
1983 on comments it had
received from many banks and community groups:
Federal responsibility for various social programs was increasingly 
being questioned,
with federal budget deficits and administration policy supporting 
a shift of these
programs to state and local governments. As one Council 
member aptly stated it,
"CRA is trying to accomplish something which was a lot more 
popular a decade
ago than it is now."
CON. ADv. CouN., FEDERAL RESERVE'S IMPLEMENTATION OF C.R.A., supra 
note 63, at 3.2.
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likely, however, is that C.R.A. will be retained and its importance
expanded.
Disenchantment with federal regulation of private enterprise, at a
general or abstract level, does not extend to specific consumer pro-
tection regulations.2 3 The deregulation of banking that has occurred
in recent years has allowed increased competition among financial
institutions and new combinations of financial services.2 4 The restric-
tions that were removed protected, at least in the first instance, the
banking industry rather than the public at large. 275 No significant
change has been made to consumer protection regulations affecting
financial institutions, such as those promulgated under the Equal
Credit Opportunity, 276 Fair Credit Billing,277 Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure,278 and Consumer Leasing Acts. 279 Public support for this class
of regulations, which includes C.R.A., remains strong.28 0
C.R.A. has never been a bureaucratic program producing massive
paperwork, detailed regulations, or compulsory changes in specific
private decisions. By requiring only that banks actively seek profitable
lending opportunities in their own communities, C.R.A. is fully
compatible with current political orientations. The most appropriate
government response to social problems, many believe, is to promote
partnership and cooperation among business and the community-
precisely C.R.A.'s approach.28' Moreover, the practical necessity of
273. Garwood, supra note 66. Though expressing his personal views only, Mr. Garwood
is Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, and so in
a position to have detailed knowledge of the extent and effects of changes in bank regulation.
274. Id. at 1298 (referring to such changes as removing restrictions on payment of interest
on deposits, on the business that can provide financial services, and on the locations where
financial services can be offered); see also Lobell, supra note 94.
275. Garwood, supra note 66.
276. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1982); Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. §
202 (1983).
277. Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1982); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226
(1983).
278. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (1982); Regulation C, 12 C.F.R.
§ 203 (1982).
279. Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1667 (1982); Regulation M, 15 C.F.R. § 113
(1983).
280. A Louis Harris poll found strong public antipathy to regulations that directly control
pricing, but "virtually no support for rolling back or dismantling consumer protection regu-
lation." Louis HARRIS & Assocs., INC., CONSUMRISM IN THE EIorTs, Study No. 822047
(1982), cited in Garwood, supra note 66, at 1299.
281. The Federal Reserve's Community Affairs Coordinator emphasizes the importance of
sensitivity to political orientations. Telephone conversation with James W. Lowell, Division of
Consumer and Community Affairs, F.R.B., Washington, D.C. (July 3, 1985). Promoting
"compliance with C.R.A.," he says, is not useful or productive. On the other hand, excellent
results have been achieved by promoting "community involvement," and "partnerships" among
banks and others in the community. Both Democrats and Republicans are responsive to
C.R.A.'s goals, when properly phrased and presented. Id.
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relying on private depository institutions to assist in community
development is increased as federal subsidies and programs for that
purpose decline. 212
The continuation of federal supervision over depository institutions
also seems assured, though the form and structure of regulatory
agencies may well change, to adapt to modem trends in the financial
services industry. The need for government supervision of institutions
that accept consumers' savings and other deposits has been firmly
established ever since the Great Depression, and periodically rein-
forced by failures of the few depository institutions still unregulated
or uninsured .83
The deregulation that has occurred to date has increased the rate
of mergers, acquisitions, and expansion of financial institutions, and
each of those transactions requires regulatory approval with consid-
eration of C.R.A. issues. Community groups have often seized the
opportunity to negotiate with the institutions for improvements in
community lending practices. 2 4 From the point of view of the finan-
cial institution, the danger of denial of the necessary regulatory
approval may be minimal,285 but the danger of expensive delay and
embarrassing publicity is great. The financial institutions are likely
to go to substantial lengths to reach agreement with community
282. Ansberry, supra note 110, at 64, cols. 1-5. The views of Michael Shea, of the
Association of Community Organizaitons for Reform Now (ACORN), which has been involved
in C.R.A. protests around the country, are representative: "There's been tremendous cutbacks
in federal housing money. We have to look elsewhere for financing." Id.
283. See, e.g., Statement of J. Charles Partee, Governor, F.R.B. (1985), supra note 271,
at 410 ("the normal perception for most industries-that one may simply look to the
marketplace to promote competition and efficiency-must be tempered by a recognition of the
need to maintain confidence in banking instituitons .... "). Collapse of depository institutions
can have serious consequences, as the 1985 crisis in several Ohio savings and loan associations
(which were not federally insured) suggest. See, e.g., Statement by Preston Martin, Vice
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the Subcommittee on
Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the Committee on Government Operations,
United States House of Representatives, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 412, 415 (1985) ("the events in
Ohio do serve to remind us of the potential consequences of the loss of public confidence in
individual depository institutions and of the celerity with which that loss can spread to other
instituitons.").
284. Garwood, supra note 66, at 1304, citing as one example the application of Citicorp
to acquire a South Dakota bank, protested by two New York community groups because of
Citicorp branch closings in New York City. See also Ansberry, supra note 110, at 64, cols. 1-
5. "The CRA, however, has assumed even greater significance with the recent rise of interstate
banking and the steady decline in federal funding for low-income housing." Id.
285. One commentator, involved with C.R.A. since its inception, has concluded that
C.R.A., "with its balancing tests, countervailing interests, and multipronged analysis, rarely
presents an obstacle to bank expansion in the 1980's." Dennis, Coping With Branch Consol-
idations, BAPas MAo., Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 22, 25, cited in Note, supra note 22, at 132
n.160.
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activists and thereby avoid the filing of a formal protest with the
regulatory authorities.2 6
Changing modes of regulation by the supervisory agencies is prob-
ably less of a threat to the goals of C.R.A. than changing technology
and economics in the financial services industry. For example, the
increasing use of automatic teller machines, often as substitutes for
branch offices, may escape C.R.A. review unless the regulations are
modified. 287 Also, legislation may be needed to extend C.R.A.-type
principles to certain nondepository financial services companies. These
firms currently are not subject to regulation by the four federal
supervisory agencies, and so are not covered by C.R.A., but are
increasingly competing with the depository institutions that are sub-
ject to C.R.A.2 8
286. See, e.g., Ansberry, supra note 110, at 64, cols. 1-5. "Rather than risk costly delays,
more and more banks, though defending their loan records to low-income borrowers, are
negotiating community investment pacts with consumer activist groups." Id. (citing several
recent examples). When the stakes are high enough, however, a bank may incur the protest
and ultimately prevail before the reguatory agency. See, e.g., Applications of Dimension Fin.
Corp. to Charter 31 Nat'l Banks in 25 States (Compt. Curt. May 9, 1984), cited and discussed
in Lobell, supra note 94, at 1087, n.71 (application approved despite C.R.A. protest and
bank's plan to "focus marketing efforts on upwardly mobile individuals").
287. The regulations currently list as one factor to be included in a C.R.A. evaluation
"[t]he bank's record of opening and closing offices and providing services at offices." 12
C.F.R. § 25.7(g) (1986). However, closing an office and opening an automatic teller machine
are not events triggering a C.R.A. evaluation. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(3)(a)-(f) (1982). Thus, a
depository institution might be able to close its offices in low-income neighborhoods and open
automatic tellers in high-income neighborhoods, thereby significantly altering the community
impact of its services, without being subjected to C.R.A. review. This situation is one illustration
of a more general observation that "new electronic technologies invites evasion of the present
branching restrictions," and regulation must adapt to new banking techniques such as automatic
tellers to avoid costly and irrational distortions in the banking system. Felsenfeld, Electronic
Banking and Its Effects on Interstate Branching Restrictions-An Analytic Approach, 54
FoRDHAm L. REv. 1019, 1021, 1059-61 (1986).
Another problem is that banks often avoid low-income neighborhoods as sites for automatic
teller machines, consigning the residents to less convenient and more expensive banking services.
EFT in the United States: Policy Reommendations and the Public Interest-The Final Report
of the National Commission of Electronic Funds Transfer, Part V- Automated Payment
Systems, BANKING L.J. DIG. v-55 (Cum. Fed. Supp. 6th ed. 1982). This pattern "constitutes
a form of geographic disinvestment, in violation of the purpose of C.R.A." Note, supra note
22, at 133. This Syracuse Law Review Note thoroughly analyzes the problem and New York's
solution under its regulations paralleling the federal C.R.A. Essentially, New York requires
advance notice of branch office closings, N.Y. BANKING LAw § 28-(c)(2) (McKinney Supp.
1986), extends C.R.A. review to changes in use of automatic teller machines, N.Y. BANKING
LAW §§ 105-a, 240-a, 396-a (McKinney Supp. 1986); N.Y. ADmN. CoDE tit. 3, § 73.1 (1985);
and adds "[t]he geographic distribution and use of automatic teller machines" as a measure
of serving community credit needs, N.Y. BANKING LAv § 28-b(3)(a)(1l-a) (McKinney Supp.
1986). See Note, supra note 22, at 140-42.
288. The issue was raised, for example, by Michael Van Buskirk, vice president of BancOne
Corp. based in Columbus, Ohio. He stated that subjecting full-service banks to C.R.A. review,
while leaving limited-service competitors such as Sears, Roebuck & Co.'s financial centers
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CONCLUSION
From some perspectives, the results attributable to the C.R.A. after
a full decade of operation are modest and largely unquantifiable.
The number of bank requests for approval of proposed mergers,
acquisitions, or office changes that have been denied on C.R.A.
grounds is negligible. The record of some federal agencies, notably
the Federal Reserve Board, suggests only the most grudging enforce-
ment efforts. The total dollar volume of lending to low- and middle-
income neighborhoods that is directly motivated by the need to
comply with C.R.A. appears large but is difficult to verify, 2 9 despite
the numerous anecdotal examples. The Act is so vague and abstract
that compliance is difficult to define, much less enforce.
An historical and comparative perspective, however, yields a dif-
ferent conclusion. C.R.A. established a basic principle of bankers'
responsibility, reversing and rebuking the views generally prevailing
previously in the banking industry and the supervisory agencies.
Financial institutions have unquestionably modified their lending policy
to consciously attempt to better serve community credit needs.
2 90
Legal developments of that nature are not rendered unimportant by
the fact that issues of implementation are left to be resolved later,
or by the fact that the tangible results are difficult to accurately
measure.
Using as an analogy a legal development of dramatically greater
import, the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education291 conclusively established for the first time that govern-
ment-supported segregation was unacceptable. Litigation and contro-
versy has continued since then, and the process has been painfully
slow, but the issues in the debate are on an altogether different
plane. The issues now are not whether integration is necessary but
rather how much is enough and what methods are appropriate.
C.R.A., though not remotely as significant as Brown, conclusively
untouched, was unfair. Michael Shea, of the Association of Community Organizations for
Reform Now ("ACORN"), an activist organization which has been involved in C.R.A. protests
around the country, agrees that firms such as Sears should be covered. "We're looking at
those too," he said. "It's just a matter of time." Ansberry, supra note 110, at 64, cols. 1-5.
289. One estimate is that, since the enactment of C.R.A., "more than $3.7 billion has
been committed in 117 cities for home mortgage, small business and other loans to predomi-
nantly low-income borrowers." Id. The article did not cite a source for this estimate, however.
290. For examples, see sections III.B. and Iv.B., supra, and sources cited therein.
291. 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
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established that depository institutions not only may legitimately lend
with a view to improving community conditions, but indeed are
obliged to attempt to do so.
The chief force for improvements in depository institutions' efforts
to meet community credit needs has been the activism of community
groups. C.R.A. has tended to bring the groups off of picket lines
on the streets outside banks and savings and loan associations, and
into the conference rooms. They now have standing and legitimacy
that they did not have before C.R.A. Their power derives largely
from the ability to cause delay in the processing of applications for
regulatory approval of mergers, acquisitions, and office changes, if
their objections are well-documented and cogently presented. Many
have been extremely successful and will continue their efforts. The
C.R.A. should be improved by establishing a private civil cause of
action so that community groups may enforce the law when super-
visory agencies decline to do so.
The banking officials and regulators who prior to 1977 resolutely
and unapologeticaliy denied that they had any responsibilities to serve
the credit needs of local communities are now in the position of
explaining how they are doing enough to fulfill those responsibilities.
The C.R.A. has performed a valuable function. It deserves to be
enforced with far greater vigor than has been demonstrated to date
by the federal banking supervisory agencies.
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